MULTI-USER SECURITY FOR MULTICAST COMMUNICATIONS by Sun, Yan
ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: MULTI-USER SECURITY FOR
MULTICAST COMMUNICATIONS
Yan Sun, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004
Dissertation directed by: Professor K. J. Ray Liu
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
The ubiquity of communication networks is facilitating the development of
wireless and Internet applications aimed at allowing users to communicate and
collaborate amongst themselves. In the future, group-oriented services will be one
of the dominant services that facilitate real-time information exchange among a
large number of diverse users. However, before these group-oriented services can
be successful deployed, technologies must be developed to guarantee the security
of the information and data exchanged in group communications.
Among all security requirements of group communication, access control is
paramount as it is the first line of defense that prevents unauthorized access to the
group communication and protects the value of application data. Access control
is usually achieved by encrypting the data using a key that is shared among all
legitimated group members. The problem of access control becomes more difficult
when the content is distributed to a dynamic group with user joining and leaving
the service for a variety of reasons. Thus, Group Key Management is required to
achieve key update with dynamic group membership.
Existing group key management schemes seek to minimize either the amount
of rounds needed in establishing the group key, or the size of the key updating
messages. They do not, however, considering the varying requirements of the
users, the underlying networks or the applications. Those generic solutions of
access control often yield large consumption of communication, computation and
storage resources, especially for large groups with highly dynamic membership
in heterogeneous networks. In addition, the design of existing key management
schemes focus on protecting the application data, but introduces vulnerabilities
in protecting the statistics of group membership information. This poses severe
security concern in various group applications.
The focus of this dissertation is to design network-specific and application spe-
cific group key management and solve the security vulnerability of key management
that reveals dynamic group membership information. This dissertation will present
scalable group key management in heterogeneous wireless network, the hierarchical
access control for multimedia applications, and a framework of securing dynamic
group membership information over multicast. The main contribution of this dis-
sertation is to advance the group key management research to achieve higher level
of scalability and security.
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Point-to-point communication has been the dominant form of computer network
communication since the beginning of networking. However, with the explosive ad-
vancement of networking and information technologies that bring a large amount of
users to communicate and collaborate, point-to-point communications faces severe
scalability challenges in a variety of emerging applications [1].
• Digital video and audio multicast over Internet, such as movie-on-demand
and video conferences.
• Widespread software distribution, such as anti-virus scanner update and se-
curity patch delivery.
• Disseminating real-time financial market information to a large audience with
various devices, including PDAs, cell phones, computers etc.
• Transportation control where road traffic pattern or air traffic control infor-
mation is distributed to many stations.
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• Multi-player games involving thousands of users simultaneously interacting
in a virtual game world.
Distributing information to a large audience cannot be achieved over point-to-
point communications without causing congestion and wasting network resources.
For group-oriented applications, Multicast is an essential mechanism to achieve
scalable information distribution.
Multicast describes communication where information is sent from one or more
parties to a set of other parties. In this case, information is distributed from one
or more senders to a set of receivers, but not to all users. Multicast is different
from broadcast where information is distributed to all users. The subtle difference
between broadcast and multicast can be neglected in many context.
Significant advancement has been seen recently, in both the underlying multi-
cast networking technology [2] as well as the deployment of applications utilizing
multicast [1]. Already there are multicast services that stream stock quotes, and
provide video and audio on demand. In the future, multicast applications will
be running in wireless mobile environment, as consumers desire to have a sim-
ilar suite of multimedia-intensive applications on their portable devices as they
currently have available to them at their desktops.
Multicast has the advantage of efficient distributing information to thousands
or even millions of users. However, multicast also creates opportunities for ma-
licious packets to reach thousands or millions of users, and introduces difficulties
in maintaining security with dynamic group membership. In this chapter, we will
first review security issues in group communications, then discuss some drawbacks
of existing security mechanisms, and finally summarize the contribution of this
thesis.
2
1.2 Security Issues in Group Communications
In general, group communications consider the following security requirements.
Confidentiality non-group members cannot read the data
Integrity data cannot be modified or deleted in any unauthorized way
Authentication claimed sender is the actual sender
Access Control only authorized parties can access the group communications
Non-repudiation Recipient can prove what messages it receives
No denial-of-service No interference by un-authorized parties
1.2.1 Access Control and Data Confidentiality
Among all those requirements, access control is the first line of defense needed to
protect the value of application data. A service provider may control access to
content by encrypting the content using a key that is shared by all valid group
members. The problem of access control becomes more difficult when the content
is distributed to a group of users. Since group membership will most likely be
dynamic with users joining and leaving the service for a variety of reasons, it is
necessary to update the group key. The issues of key generation and update are
addressed by Key Management protocols [3, 4]. In addition, encryption and key
management together ensure data confidentiality because unauthorized entities do
not possess the group key and cannot decrypt group communication.
The main problem of group key management is to update keys in dynamically
changing group such that a receiver can decrypt the data only when he is a valid
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group member. In particular, a group key management protocol should satisfy the
following security requirements.
• Group key secrecy - non-group members cannot obtain any group key.
• Backward secrecy - the join user cannot decrypt the content that was sent
before his join.
• Forward secrecy - the departure/revoked user cannot decrypt the content
that is sent after his deletion from the group.
To achieve forward and backward secrecy, the group key is updated after each
member join and departure event, and the new key information is distributed to
the legitimated group members . It is important to update and distribute keys in
a secure, scalable and reliable way. In Chapter 1.4, these issues will be discussed
in detail. Here we list the properties that a good key management scheme should
have.
• Low communication, computation and storage overhead
• Scalability for large dynamic groups
• Reliable distribution of key update messages
• The ability of detecting dishonest group members and recovering from key
generation failure.
1.2.2 Service Authentication and Verification
Multicast Authentication is another essential security mechanism that ensures data
integrity and validates the source of the data. Authentication can be achieved in
4
an asymmetric manner such as digital signatures. Although digital signatures can
solve the authentication problem, they are inefficient due to their prohibitive com-
putational overhead [5–7]. In point-to-point communications, data authentication
is usually achieved through a symmetric manner where the sender and the receiver
share a secret key to compute a message authentication code (MAC) of all commu-
nicated data. When a message with a correct MAC arrives, the receiver is assured
that the sender generated that message. However, symmetric authentication is
generally not secure in multicast because every group member knows the MAC
key and can impersonate the sender. It is required that every receiver can verify
the authenticity of messages without being able to generate authentic messages,
which is asymmetric in nature. Currently, the most popular multicast authen-
tication schemes use the principle of delayed key disclosure in order to achieve
the asymmetry needed for multicast authentication using symmetric cryptogra-
phy [8–12]. Those schemes require time synchronization between the source and
the receivers. The main idea is to have the sender attach a MAC to each packet
computed using a key known only to itself. The receivers buffer the received pack-
ets without being able to authenticate them. A short time after the delivery of
the packets, the sender discloses the key and the receivers are later able to au-
thenticate the packets. After the key is disclosed, the receivers will not accept the
packages with MAC generated by this key. A representative of such authentication
schemes is TESLA. Interested readers can refer to [11] for the details of TESLA
and other multicast authentication schemes. In addition, non-repudiation problem
and prevention of Denial-of-service attack in secure multicast communications are
relatively new topics. Some studies can be found in [13–15]. In this dissertation,
the focus is access control for secure group communications.
5
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Figure 1.1: A typical key management tree
1.3 Key Management for Group Access Control
Key management schemes can be classified as centralized schemes and contributory
schemes [16]. In centralized schemes, group members trust a centralized server,
referred to as the key distribution center (KDC), which generates and distributes
encryption keys [4, 16–24]. In contributory schemes, group members are trusted
equally and all participate in the formation of the group key [25–33]. In this section,
we introduce popular centralized and contributory key management schemes.
1.3.1 Centralized Key Management
The most common class of centralized key management schemes employ a tree
hierarchy to maintain the keying material [3, 16–19]. As illustrated in Figure 1.1,
each node of the key tree is associated with a key. The root of the key tree is
associated with the session key (SK), Ks, which is used to encrypt the multicast
content. Each leaf node is associated with a user’s private key, ui, which is only
known by this user and the KDC. The intermediate nodes are associated with
6
Fixed ID Version Revision Secrete material
key selector key content
Figure 1.2: Key structure
key-encrypted-keys (KEK), which are auxiliary keys and only for the purpose of
protecting the session key and other KEKs. To make concise presentation, we do
not distinguish the node and the key associated with this node in the remainder
of the thesis.
Each key contains the secrete material that is the content of the key and a key
selector that is used to distinguish the key. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, the key
selector consists of: 1) a unique ID that stays the same even if the key content
changes and 2) a version and revision field, reflecting update in the keying material.
The version number is increased whenever new keying material is sent out by
the group manager upon user departure, while the revision number is increased
whenever the key is passed through a one-way function. The usage of the version
and revision numbers will be explained in the description of the key updating
process.
Each user stores his private key, the session key, and a set of KEKs on the
path from himself to the root of the key tree. In the example shown in Figure
1.1, user 16 possesses {u16, Ks, Kε, K1, K11, K111}. When a user leaves the service,
all his keys need to be updated in order to prevent him from accessing the future
communication. Here we use the scheme presented in [18] to demonstrate the key
updating process. When user 16 leaves, the KDC generates new keys and conveys
new keys to the remaining users through a set of rekeying messages as:
• {Knew111 }u15 : user 15 acquires Knew111 ,
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• {Knew11 }Knew111 ,{Knew11 }Kold110 : user 13,14,15 acquire Knew11 ,
• {Knew1 }Knew11 ,{Knew1 }Kold10 : user 9, · · · , 15 acquire Knew1 ,
• {Knewε }Knew1 ,{Knewε }Kold0 : user 1, · · · , 15 acquire Knewε ,
• {Knews }Knewε : all remaining users acquire Knews ,
where the notation xold represents the old version of key x, xnew represents the new
version of key x, and {y}x represents the key y encrypted by key x. The version
numbers are increased for all new keys. This key updating procedure guarantees
that all remaining users obtain the new session key and KEKs, while user 16 is
unable to acquire the new keys. Since the rekeying messages are transmitted in the
multicast channel [17], every user receives all rekeying messages. The session key,
KEKs and users’ private keys usually have the same length. The communication
overhead associated with key updating can be described by rekeying message size,
defined as the amounts of rekeying messages measured in the unit as the same size
as the SK or KEKs. In this example, the rekeying message size is 8 when user
16 leaves the service. It has been shown that the rekeying message size increases
linearly with the logarithm of the group size [18].
When a user joins the service, the KDC chooses a leaf position on the key
tree to put the joining user. The KDC updates the keys along the path from the
new leaf to the root by generating the new keys from the old keys using a one-
way function and increasing the revision numbers of the new keys. The joining
user obtains the new keys through the unicast channel. Other users in the group
will know about the key change when the data packet indicating the increase of
the revision numbers first arrives, and compute the new keys using the one-way







































Figure 1.3: Key management architecture in centralized scenario
In summary, Figure 1.3 illustrates the high level diagram of centralized access
control mechanism for group communications. All users register at the Key Distri-
bution Center (KDC) that generates and distributes keys. With the group session
key, secure communication can be established between the sender and the receivers
through the data security protocol. The KDC knows group membership changes
through the registration protocol and then updates keys through the rekey protocol
by transmitting a set of rekeying messages in the multicast channel.
1.3.2 Contributory Key Management
In some scenarios, it is not preferred to rely on a centralized server that arbitrates
the establishment of the group key. This might occur in applications where group
members do not explicitly trust a single entity, or there are no servers or group
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members who have sufficient resources to maintain, generate, and distribute keying
information. Thus, the distributed solution of the key agreement problem has
drawn considerable attention [25–33].
The contributory schemes do not rely on centralized servers. Instead, every
group member makes independent contribution and participates the process of
group key establishment, and the members’ personal keys are not disclosed to
any other entities. The early design of contributory key agreements mostly con-
siders the efficiency of key generation for the initial establishment of the group
key [25, 27, 28, 34]. Among them, Ingemarsson et al. first introduced a confer-
ence key distribution system based on a ring topology [25]. Later, Burmester and
Desmedt proposed a key distribution system that takes only three rounds to gen-
erate a group key [27]. Steiner et al. extended the two-party Diffie-Hellman (DH)
protocol and proposed group Diffie-Hellman protocols GDH.1/2/3 [28,29]. Becker
and Willie studied the communication complexity of contributory key agreements
and proposed the octopus and 2d-octopus protocols [34]. While achieving efficient
initial key establishment, most of these schemes encounter high rekeying complex-
ity upon membership changes. Recent research on key management becomes more
aware of the scalability issue in both key establishment and key update for large
and dynamic groups. After the tree-based approaches were proposed in the central-
ized scenario [4, 17], logical tree structure is also used in the contributory setting
by Kim et al in their TGDH scheme [31], and by Dondeti et al in their DISEC
scheme [32].
Next, we briefly review tree-based contributory key management schemes [31,
32] that use the two-party DH protocol [35] as a basic module. Let A and B denote
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Figure 1.4: Tree-based contributory key management
Two-party DH protocol establishes a share key between A and B without revealing
their private keys as follows. First, A sends the message {gKA mod p} to B, and
B sends the message {gKB mod p} to A, where g and p, large prime numbers, are









obtain the shared key KAB.
To establish a shared key among a group of user, the key tree is constructed
in a bottom-up fashion. Users are first grouped into pairs and each pair performs
a two-party DH to form a sub-group. These sub-groups will again pair up and
perform the two-party DH to form larger sub-groups. Continuing in this way,
the final group key can be obtained. An example is shown in Figure 1.4(a) with
four group members, and member Mi has private key ri. The group key K〈0,0〉 is
computed in two rounds as
1. M1 and M2 generate a shared key K〈1,0〉 = (gr1r2 mod p); and M3 and M4
generate a shared key K〈1,1〉 = (gr3r4 mod p). Then, M1 and M2 form a
subgroup; and M3 and M4 form a subgroup.



































Figure 1.5: Key Management architecture in centralized sceneries
as K〈0,0〉 = (gK〈1,0〉K〈1,1〉 mod p).
In a user join event, the new user will first be paired with an insertion node,
which could be either a leaf node or an inner node, to perform a two-party DH.
Then all the keys on the path from the insertion node to the tree root are updated
recursively. An example is shown in Figure 1.4(b). When member M5 joins the
group, the insertion node is chosen as node 〈2, 3〉 in Figure 1.4(a), then M4 and
M5 perform one round of DH to generate a new inner node 〈2, 3〉 in Figure 1.4(b),
followed by the key updates on the path 〈2, 3〉 → 〈1, 1〉 → 〈0, 0〉.
Upon a user’s departure, the leaving user’s node and its parent node will be
deleted from the key tree. Its sibling node will assume the position of its parent
node. Then all the keys on the path from the leaving user’s grandparent node to
the tree root are recalculated from the bottom to the top.
Compared with centralized schemes, contributory key management has the
advantage of not relying on a single trusted key server, but requires performing
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computationally expensive cryptographic primitives, such as modular multiplica-
tion and exponentiation [36,37]. As a summary, Figure 1.5 illustrates the high level
diagram of contributory access control mechanism for group communications.
1.4 Thesis Overview and Contribution
Key management is accomplished either by using a centralized entity that is respon-
sible for distributing keys to users, or by contributory protocols where legitimate
members exchange information to agree upon a key. Typical group key manage-
ment schemes seek to minimize either the amount of rounds needed in establishing
the group key, or the size of the rekeying messages. However, those approaches do
not factor in the varying requirements of the users, the underlying network, or the
application, and are therefore not well suited to provide efficient solutions for all
users, for all networks, or for all types of applications. The first two components
of this dissertation focus on tailoring access control solutions to wireless networks
where users are mobile and the medium is inherently unreliable, and to multimedia
applications where the rich properties of the content allow for an improved design
of key management. All these scenarios introduce challenges that are not present
in conventional key management for generic applications. In order to design better
security protocols, it is necessary to look at the security system from an adver-
sarial point-of-view. The third component of this dissertation addresses a security
concern in popular key management schemes and proposes a framework to immu-
nize the key management protocols. Next, we introduce these three components
individually.
Topology-aware key management in wireless networks
To achieve forward and backward security, rekeying messages are sent to group
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members when there are users joining or leaving the multicast group. In applica-
tions where there are many users and frequent additions or deletions to the group
membership, key management can introduce a significant communication burden.
rekeying messages must be delivered reliably because the loss of rekeying messages
results in severe performance degradation [3]. If a user loses one key, he will not
be able to access multicast content encrypted by this key and may not be able
to acquire future keys from future rekeying messages either. Further, in real-time
multicast applications the rekeying messages should also be delivered in a timely
manner so that users receive the rekeying messages before the new key takes ef-
fect. These reasons alone motivate the need for building communication-efficient
key management schemes. In wireless multicast scenarios, however, the need is
even more pronounced since bandwidth is limited and data typically experience a
higher transmission error rate than in conventional environments.
In the first part of this dissertation, we propose a method for designing a cen-
tralized multicast key management tree for a group of users in a cellular network.
Traditional tree-based multicast key management schemes do not consider the
effect of the network topology upon the delivery of the rekeying messages, and
therefore waste network resources by sending rekeying messages to users who do
not need them. We address this issue by proposing to match the key management
tree to the network topology, thereby localizing the delivery of the rekeying mes-
sages and reducing the communication costs. In mobile environments, the user
will subscribe to a multicast service under an initial host agent, and through the
course of his service undergo handoff to different base stations. We will discuss
issues arising from user relocation and present a handoff scheme that is suitable
for topology-matching key management. In addition, we prove that optimizing
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the proposed key tree is equivalent to optimizing a set of independent smaller-
scale subtrees. This significantly reduces the complexity of the tree design. A
tree structure that can easily adapt to changes in the number of users and a tree
generation algorithm that considers the heterogeneity of the network will also be
introduced.
Hierarchical Group Access Control
Existing key management schemes, such as in [4, 16–33], address the access
control issues in a single multicast session. They focus on establishing and updating
keys with dynamic membership and provide all group members the same level of
access privilege. That is, the users who possess the decryption keys have the
full access to the content, and the users who do not have the decryption keys
cannot interpret the data. In practice, many group applications contain multiple
related data streams and have the members with various access privileges. These
applications prevail in various scenarios.
• Multimedia applications distributing data in multi-layer coding format [38].
For example, in a video broadcast, users with a normal TV receiver can
receive the normal format, while others with HDTV receivers can receive
both the normal format and the extra information needed to achieve HDTV
resolution.
• Multicast programs containing several related services, such as weather,
news, traffic and stock quote.
• Communications in hierarchically managed organizations, such as military
group communications where participants have various access authorization.
Since group members subscribe to different data steams, or possibly multiple of
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them, it is necessary to develop access control mechanism that supports the multi-
level access privilege, which shall be referred to as the hierarchical group access
control.
The access control issue for each data stream can be managed separately using
existing key management schemes . However, this leads to inefficient use of keys
and does not scale well when the number of data streams increases. In the sec-
ond part of this dissertation, we develop a multi-group key management scheme
that addresses the generalized hierarchical group access control problem. Partic-
ularly, we design an integrated key graph that maintains the keying material for
all members with different access privileges and incorporates new functionalities
that are not present in conventional multicast key management, such as the user
relocation on the key graph. The proposed multi-group key management scheme
achieves forward and backward secrecy [31] when users (1) join the group com-
munication with certain access privilege; (2) leave the group; and (3) add or drop
the subscription of one or several data streams (change access privilege). The
idea of the integrated key graph can be used in both centralized and contributory
environments. Compared with using single-session access control solutions, such
as a variety of tree-based key management scheme [18, 31], the proposed scheme
reduces the usage of the communication, computation and storage overhead, and
is scalable when the number of access levels increases.
Securing Dynamic Group Membership Information
Key management is employed to prevent unauthorized access to multicast con-
tent. We discovered, however, the rekeying process associated with multicast key
management can disclose information about the dynamics of the group member-
ship to both insiders and outsiders. We collectively refer to group dynamics in-
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formation (GDI) as information describing the dynamic membership of a group
application, such as the number of users in the multicast group as a function of
time, and the number of users who join or leave the service during a time interval.
The leakage of GDI from the rekeying process can lead to serious security and
privacy problems. For example, in a commercial multicast program, the service
provider performs group management and has the knowledge of GDI. However, it
is highly undesirable to disclose instant detailed dynamic membership information
to competitors, who could develop effective competition strategies by analyzing the
statistical behavior of the audience. Another example is a military group commu-
nication scenario, where GDI represents the number of soldiers on the battlefield
and the number of soldiers moving into or out of certain areas. In this situation,
the valid group members, i.e. regular soldiers, may only be entitled to obtain gen-
eral information through the secure group communication, but not to acquire GDI.
Further, leaking GDI to outsiders, most likely to the enemies, can be devastating.
In the wireless scenario, the need for studying GDI leakage and developing leakage-
immune multicast key management schemes is even more pronounced because the
broadcast nature of the wireless media enables anyone within the broadcast range
to observe the encrypted data.
In the third part of this dissertation, we demonstrate that the key management
schemes can reveal the GDI easily and propose a framework of protecting GDI from
inside and outside attackers. We have developed two effective strategies to attack
and steal information about the membership dynamics from the tree-based central-
ized schemes [3,4,16–19] that employ tree hierarchy for the maintenance of keying
material. These strategies involve exploiting the format of rekeying messages and
estimating GDI directly from the size of the rekeying messages. We also developed
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an anti-attack method that is fully compatible with the existing key management
schemes. By utilizing batch rekeying [39] and introducing phantom users, the pro-
posed anti-attack method aims to minimize the mutual information between the
rekeying process observed by the attackers and the true group dynamics. Various
aspects of the proposed anti-attack scheme, such as the communication overhead
and the leakage of GDI, are evaluated based on the data obtained from MBone
sessions. The analysis on other non-tree based schemes is also provided. In con-
tributory key management, each group member need to be aware of other group
members in order to establish the shared group key. Thus, the task of protecting
GDI is more difficult than it is in the centralized scenario. We provide qualitative
analysis on the vulnerability of various contributory schemes and techniques that
can be used to protect GDI in the distributed environments.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The topology-matching
key management scheme for wireless networks is discussed in Chapter 2. The key-
graph based hierarchical group access control is presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, we discuss attack and protection technologies for dynamic group membership






There has been significant advancements in building a global wireless infrastructure
that will free users from the confines of static communication networks. Users will
be able to access the Internet from anywhere at anytime. As wireless connections
become ubiquitous, consumers will desire to have multicast applications running
on their mobile devices. In order to meet such a demand, there has been increasing
research efforts in the area of wireless multicast [40–42].
In wireless networks, where bandwidth is limited and transmission error rate
is high, the design of key management schemes need to consider the transmission
of the rekeying messages in order to ensure reliable key distribution and reduce
the communication burden associated with key management. Previous key man-
agement schemes focus entirely on generating the rekeying messages, but they
neglect the issues of the delivery of the rekeying messages and do not consider the
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underlying network topology.
In this Chapter, we propose a topology-aware centralized key management
scheme for multicast applications in a cellular network. By matching the key
management tree to the network topology and localizing the delivery of rekeying
messages, we can significantly reduce the communication burden associated with
rekeying. In Section 2.2, we introduce the concept of matching the key tree to the
network topology and motivate the reduction in the communication cost associated
with rekeying. In mobile environments, the user will subscribe to a multicast
service under an initial host agent, and through the course of his service undergo
handoff to different base stations. In Section 2.3, we discuss issues arising from user
relocation and present a handoff scheme that is suitable for topology-matching key
management. In Section 2.4, we analyze the effect that matching the key tree to
topology has upon the communication overhead. We then address the complexity
of designing the key management tree in Section 2.5 by proving that optimizing
the proposed key tree is equivalent to optimizing a set of independent smaller-
scale subtrees. This significantly reduces the complexity of the tree design. We
describe, in Section 2.6, a tree structure that can easily adapt to changes in the
number of users and a tree generation algorithm that considers the heterogeneity
of the network. We then describe a procedure to build the key tree and determine
the parameters that optimize the tree. Finally, simulation results are presented in
Section 2.7.
2.2 Topology-Matching Key Management Tree
In this section, we introduce the benefits of matching the key tree to the net-
work topology. We outline a procedure to design the key management tree and
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define the cost functions that we use in the rest of the chapter for measuring the
communication burden associated with key updating.
Let us revisit the example of tree-based centralized key management in Section
4.2.3 (see Figure 1.1). As user 16 leaves the multicast service, all of his keys
are updated through a set of rekeying messages. It is seen that most rekeying
messages are only useful to a subset of users, who are always neighbors on the
key management tree. In fact, the first rekeying message is only useful to user 15,
the second rekeying message is only useful to users 13,14,15, the third rekeying
message is useful to users 9, 10, · · · , 15, and the fourth and fifth rekeying messages
are useful to all users. Therefore, rekeying messages do not have to be sent to
every user in the multicast group.
We propose to exploit this observation in designing a key management tree.
Our key management tree will match the network topology in such a way that
the neighbors on the key tree are also physical neighbors on the network. By
delivering the rekeying messages only to the users who need them, we may take
advantage of the fact that the key tree matches the network topology, and localize
the delivery of rekeying messages to small regions of the network. This lessens the
amount of traffic crossing portions of the network that do not have users who need
to be rekeyed. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to have the assistance
of entities that would control the rekeying message transmission, such as the base
stations in cellular wireless networks.
A cellular network model, as depicted in Figure 2.1 and proposed in [43], con-
sists of mobile users, base stations (BS) and supervisor hosts (SH). The SHs admin-
istrate the BSs and handle most of the routing and protocol details for mobile users.











Figure 2.1: A cellular wireless network model
connections, while the BSs and the mobile users are connected through wireless
channels. In this work, the SHs can represent any entity that administers BSs,
such as the region servers presented in [44] and radio network controllers (RNCs)
in 3G networks [45]. In cellular wireless networks, multicast communication can
be implemented efficiently by exploiting the inherent broadcasting nature of the
wireless media [46–48]. In this case, multicast data is first routed to the BSs using
multicast routing techniques designed for wireline networks [2], and then broadcast
by the BSs to mobile users.
If we assume that both the SHs and the BSs can determine whether the rekeying
messages are useful for the users under them, then the cellular wireless network
has the capability of sending messages to a subset of users. In particular, the SHs
multicast a rekeying message to their BSs if and only if the message is useful to
one or several of their BSs, and the BSs broadcast the rekeying message to their
users if and only if the message is useful to the users under them. The information
needed to identify whether a SH or BS needs a rekeying message can be sent
in the rekeying message header. We shall not consider the size of this overhead
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Figure 2.2: A Topology -matching key management tree
information in our calculation since this overhead is typically small compared to
the size of the actual rekeying messages, and is implementation-dependent. Hence,
when the key tree matches the network topology, we can localize the delivery of
rekeying messages.
We design a key management tree that matches the network topology in three
steps:
• Step 1: Design a subtree for the users under each BS. These subtrees are
referred to as user subtrees.
• Step 2: Design subtrees that govern the key hierarchy between the BSs and
the SH. These subtrees are referred to as BS subtrees.
• Step 3: Design a subtree that governs the key hierarchy between the SH and
the KDC. This subtree is referred to as the SH subtree.
The combined key management tree is called a Topology-Matching Key Manage-
ment (TMKM) tree. Figure 2.2 illustrates a TMKM tree for the network topology
shown in Figure 2.1. Traditional key management trees, such as those in [16–19],
23
are independent of the network topology, and we call them Topology Independent
Key Management (TIKM) trees. When using a TIKM tree, the users are scat-
tered all over the network, and therefore it is not possible to localize the delivery
of rekeying messages.
We study the communication burden of the rekeying messages in the wired
portion and in the wireless portion of the network separately. Under each SH, the
wireline-message-size is defined as the total size of the rekeying messages multicast
by the SHs to the BSs, and the wireless-message-size is defined as the total size
of the rekeying messages broadcast by the BSs. The message size is measured in
units whose bit length is the same size as the key length. In this work, we assume
that the network connection between the KDC and the SHs has ample bandwidth
resource and experience very low error rate. Thus, the wireline-message-size does
not include the communication overhead between the KDC and the SHs.
Let Sl1 denote the wireline-message-size under the l
th SH and Sl2 denote the
wireless-message-size under the lth SH, where l = 1, 2, · · · , nsh and nsh is the total
number of SHs. For example, when the length of the session key and KEKs is
128 bits each, if a 256 bit long rekeying message is multicast by the lth SH and
then broadcast by 3 BSs under the lth SH, then Sl1 = 2 and S
l
2 = 6. Assuming
that users do not leave simultaneously, then the rekeying wireline cost, Cwire, the












CT = γ · Cwireless + (1− γ) · Cwire (2.1)
where E[.] indicates expectation over the statistics governing the user joining and
leaving behavior. Here, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the wireless weight, which represents the im-
portance of considering the wireless cost, and {αl1} and {αl2} are the sets of weight
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factors that describe the importance of considering the wireline-message-size and
wireless-messages-size under the lth SH respectively. When SHs administrate areas
with similar physical network structure and channel conditions, we can approxi-
mate {αl1} and {αl2} by 1. In addition, we define the combined-message-size as





For a given wireless weight γ, {αl1}, and {αl2}, both the TMKM and TIKM
trees should be designed to minimize the total communication cost, CT .
2.3 Handoff Schemes for TMKM Tree
In mobile environments, the user will subscribe to a multicast service under an
initial host agent, and through the course of his service move to different cells and
undergo handoff to different base stations. Although the user has moved, he still
maintains his subscription to the multicast group. Since the TMKM tree depends
on the network topology, the physical location of a user affects the user’s position
on the key management tree. When a user moves from one cell to another cell,
the user needs to be relocated on the TMKM tree. In this section, we propose
an efficient handoff scheme for our TMKM trees. In this context, the expression
handoff scheme will only refer to the process of relocating a user on the key tree.
One solution to the handoff problem is to treat the moving user as if he departs
the service from the cell that he is leaving from and then rejoins the service in the
cell that he has moved to. This scheme, referred to as the simple handoff scheme,
is not practical for mobile networks with frequent handoffs since rekeying messages
are sent whenever handoffs occur.
During handoff, if a user remains subscribed to the multicast group, it is not
necessary to remove the user from the cell where he previously stayed. Allowing a
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Figure 2.3: Key update process when user u moves from cell i to cell j
mobile user to have more than one set of valid keys while he stays in the service
does not compromise the requirements of access control, as long as all of the keys
that he possesses are updated when he finally leaves the service. In order to trace
both the users’ handoff behavior and the key updating process, we employ a wait-
to-be-removed (WTBR) list for each cell. The WTBR list of the cell i, denoted by
WTBRi, contains the users who (1) possess a set of valid keys on the user subtree
of cell i and (2) are currently in the service but not in cell i. These WTBR lists
are maintained by the KDC.
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Let tiupdate denote the time of the last key update that occurs due to a departure
occurring in cell i, and let tujoin denote the time when the user u first joins the
service. In addition, we define keysetui to be the set of keys possessed by the user
u while he is in cell i. We propose an efficient handoff scheme that is illustrated
in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, as:
• When user u moves from cell i to cell j,
1. Put u on the WTBR list of cell i, i.e. WTBRi, and remove him from
the user subtree of cell i.
2. If u has been in cell j before and is on WTBRj, put u back on the
branch of the subtree that he previously belonged to and remove him
from WTBRj. If u is not on WTBRj, put u on the most recently
updated branch on the user subtree of cell j. We note that the set of
keys associated with u’s new position, keysetuj , was updated at time
tjupdate.
3. If tujoin > t
j
update, the keys in keyset
u
j are updated using the procedure
for user join described in [18]. If tujoin ≤ tjupdate, the keys do not need to
be updated.
4. The keys in keysetuj are sent to u through unicast.
The purpose of step 3 is to prevent u from taking advantage of the handoff
process to access the communication that occurred before he joined. To see
this, let u join the service at tujoin = t0 in cell i, and then immediately move
to cell j. After relocation, user u obtains keys in keysetuj that is updated at
time tjupdate = t0 − ∆, where ∆ is a positive number. In this case, if we do
not update the keys in keysetuj and u has recorded the communication in cell
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j before joining, u will be able to decrypt the multicast content transmitted
in [t0 −∆, t0), during which time he is not a valid group member.
• When user u leaves the multicast service from cell j:
1. The keys that are processed by u and still valid should be updated. In
particular, the keys in keysetuj and {keysetui : WTBRi contains u} are
updated using the procedure for user departure in [18].
2. Check other users on the WTBR lists that contain u. If u and another
user u∗ are both on WTBRi, and keysetui = keyset
u∗
i , remove u
∗ from
WTBRi. It is noted that u
∗ is removed from WTBRi when u∗ does not
have valid keys associated with cell i any more. Step 2 does not require
extra rekeying messages.
3. Remove u from all WTBR lists.
Thus, a user will be removed from the WTBR lists not only when he leaves
the service, but also when other users who share the same keys leave the service.
Compared with the simple handoff scheme, the efficient handoff scheme can reduce
the key updating caused by user relocation because the number of cells that need
to update keys is smaller than the number of cells that a user has ever visited.
When the key tree matches with the network topology, handoffs result in users’
relocation on the key tree, which inevitably introduce extra cost to the task of key
management. In this work, we assume that the KDC has significant computation
and storage resources and do not investigate the cost for the KDC to maintain and
update the WTBR lists. We will focus on the extra communication cost due to
the fact that more than one set of keys may need to be updated for a departure
user when handoffs exist.
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Figure 2.4: Key update process when user u leaves the service from cell j
2.4 Performance Analysis
Matching the key management tree with the network topology has two contrasting
effects on the rekeying message communication cost. First, the cost of sending
one rekeying message is reduced because only a subset of the BSs broadcast the
message. Second, the number of rekeying messages may increase due to handoffs.
In this section, we analyze these two effects and investigate the influence that user
mobility and the wireless weight have upon the performance of the TMKM scheme.
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To simplify the analysis, we assume that the system has aL0 SHs, each SH
administrates aL1 BSs, and each BS has aL2 users, where a ≥ 2, L0, L1 and L2
are positive integers. We also assume that the SHs administer areas with similar
network structure and conditions. Therefore, {αl1} and {αl2} are approximated
by 1. The user subtrees, BS subtrees, and SH subtree are designed as balanced
trees with degree a and level L2, L1, and L0, respectively. For fair comparison,
the TIKM tree is also designed as an a-ary balanced tree with (L0 + L1 + L2)
levels. In this work, the level of a tree is defined as the maximum number of nodes
on the path from a leaf node to the root excluding the leaf node. Since the SHs
are usually in charge of large areas, the probability of a user moving between SHs
during a multicast service is much smaller than the probability of handoffs that
are under one SH. In this analysis, we assume that there are no SH level handoffs.
For the present computation, we only calculate the communication cost caused by
one departure user based on the rekeying procedure described in [3, 17, 18].
As illustrated by the example in Section 2.2, rekeying messages with size (a ·L)
need to be transmitted when one user leaves from a balanced key tree with degree a
and level L. When using the TIKM tree, rekeying messages with size a(L0+L1+L2)
are transmitted under aL0 SHs and broadcast by aL0+L1 BSs. Therefore, when one
user leaves the service, wireline-message-size, denoted by C̃tikmw , and the wireless-
message-size, denoted by C̃tikmwl , are computed as
C̃tikmw = (aL0 + aL1 + aL2)a
L0 (2.2)
C̃tikmwl = (aL0 + aL1 + aL2)a
L0+L1 . (2.3)
The performance of the TMKM tree is affected by the user handoff behavior.
We define the random variable I as the number of WTBR lists that contain the
departing member when he leaves the service. We also introduce the function
30
B(b, i, a) that describes the number of intermediate KEKs that need to be updated.
B(b, i, a) is equivalent to the expected number of occupied boxes when putting i
items in b boxes with repetition, where each box can have at most a items. A
box is called occupied when one or more items are put into the box. The detailed
calculation of B(b, i, a) is given in Appendix A.
When one user leaves the service and he is on I = i WTBR lists, we can show
that:
• We need to update (i · L2) keys on user subtrees. Thus, rekeying messages
with total size (iaL2 − 1) are transmitted under one SH and broadcast by a
single BS.
• We need to update B(aL1−m, i, am) KEKs on the level (L1 − m) of the BS
subtree. Thus, messages with size aB(aL1−m, i, am) are transmitted under
one SH and broadcast by am BSs. Here, m = 1, · · · , L1, and the level 0 of a
tree is just the root.
• We need to update (at) KEKs on the level (L0− t) of the SH subtree. Thus,
messages with size (at+1) are sent under (at) SHs and broadcast by (aL1 · at)
BSs. Here, t = 1, 2, · · · , L0.
• In addition, we need one message to update the session key Ks. This message
is sent to all aL0 SHs and aL0+L1 BSs.
Therefore, when the departing user belongs to i WTBR lists, the expected value
of the wireline-message-size, denoted by Ctmkmw (i), and the expected value of the
wireless-message-size, denoted by Ctmkmwl (i), are computed as
Ctmkmw (i) = iaL2 +
L1∑
m=1

































































































































































Figure 2.5: Comparison of the wireless cost and the wireline cost for one user
departure







at+1 + aL0+L1 . (2.5)
The performance of the TIKM tree and the TMKM tree can be compared by






wl (i). In Figure 2.5,
these values are plotted for different i and L0, when the other parameters are fixed
as a = 2, L1 = 3, and L2 = 6. Since the TIKM tree is not affected by handoffs,
C̃tikmw and C̃
tikm
w are constant. Figure 2.5(a) and Figure 2.5(b) show the wireline-
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message-size and wireless-message-size respectively, when the system has only one
SH. Figure 2.5(c) and Figure 2.5(d) show the corresponding curves for 2 SHs, while
Figure 2.5(e) and Figure 2.5(f) depict the corresponding curves for systems with
8 SHs. We observe that:
• Both Ctmkmw (i) and Ctmkmwl (i) are increasing functions of i.
• The TMKM tree always reduces the wireless-message-size, and this advan-
tage becomes larger when the system contains more SHs.
• For systems containing only one SH, i.e. L0 = 0, the TMKM trees intro-
duce larger wireline-message-size than TIKM trees due to the handoff ef-
fects. When there are multiple SHs, the TMKM scheme can take advantage
of the fact that some SHs do not need to transmit rekeying messages to their
BSs, and can reduce the wireline-message-size when i is small. It should be
noted that the wireline cost will be larger than that given in (2.4) if there
are SH-level handoffs.
Since TMKM trees reduce the wireless-message-size more effectively than re-
ducing the wireline message size, a larger wireless weight γ leads to an improved
advantage of TMKM trees over TIKM trees. Using large γ is a reasonable scenario
since the wireless portion of the network usually experiences a higher error rate
and has less available bandwidth when compared to the wireline portion, which
makes the wireless cost the major concern in many realistic systems. In addition,
the communication cost of the TMKM tree increases with the number of cells that
need to update keys when a user leaves. Therefore, when handoffs are less likely
to happen, the TMKM tree has larger advantage over the TIKM tree.
33
Scalability is another important performance measure of key management schemes
[3]. We define N = aL0 as the number of SHs. When N → ∞, the scalability
properties can be easily obtained from (2.2)-(2.5), and are summarized in Table
2.1. Both Figure 2.5 and Table 2.1 demonstrate that the communication cost of
TMKM trees scales better than that of TIKM trees when more SHs participate in
the multicast.
wireline-message-size wireless-message-size
TIKM ∼ aN loga N ∼ aL1+1N loga N
TMKM ∼ a2 loga N ∼ aL1+2 loga N
Table 2.1: Scalability comparison between TMKM and TIKM trees when the
number of SHs(N)→∞.
2.5 Separability of the Optimization Problem
The TMKM tree consists of user-subtrees, BS-subtrees, and SH-subtrees. In this
section, we show that optimizing the entire TMKM tree is equivalent to optimizing
those subtrees individually. This is desirable since optimizing the subtrees sepa-
rately reduces the dimension of the search space for optimal tree parameters and
significantly reduces the complexity of tree design.
In this work, we assume that the users under the same SH have the same
joining, departure and mobility behavior. Thus, the user subtrees under the same
SH have the same structure. It is easy to verify that the main results in this
section still hold in scenarios where the dynamic behavior of the users varies under
different BSs. However, for the discussion in this chapter, we will restrict our
attention to the case where the dynamic behavior of the users between different
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BSs is identical. In addition, we assume that the number of participating SHs and
BSs do not change during the multicast service. In order to make the presentation
more concise, we introduce the notation Dk,l to represent the situation where k
users are under the lth SH and one of these users leaves the service.











pl(k) : pmf of the number of users under the lth SH,
Gl(k) : probability that a user leaves from the lth SH
given that k users are under the lth SH,
El(k) : the expected value of the combined-message-
size given the condition Dk,l.
When a user leaves, the keys that need to be updated are divided into three cat-
egories: (1) the keys on the user subtrees, (2) the keys on the BS subtrees, and





Al3 denote the expected value of the combined-message-size under the l
th SH re-
sulting from updating the keys on the user-subtrees, BS-subtrees and SH-subtrees,
respectively. We note that Al3 is not a function of k when there are no SH-level






















We observe that the structure of the user-subtrees only affects Al1(k), the struc-
ture of the BS-subtrees only affects Al2(k), and the structure of the SH-subtrees
only affects Al3. Therefore, for the TMKM tree, the user-subtrees, BS-subtrees
and SH subtree can be designed and optimized separately. Particularly, the user-


















2.6 Design of the TMKM Tree
Key management schemes are closely related to the key management architecture,
which describes the entities in the network that perform key management [3]. In
cellular wireless networks, the BSs are not trusted to perform key management
because they can be easily tampered with [43]. The SHs are able to perform key
management if they are trusted and have the necessary computation and storage
capabilities. The trustiness of the SHs depends on both the business model and
the protection on the SHs. Based on whether SHs perform key management, the
systems can be classified into two categories:
• In the first category, each SH performs key management for a subset of the
group members who reside in the region where this SH is in charge. Each SH
can be looked at as a local key distribution center. Without loss of generality,
since the SHs are independent and may even adopt different key management
schemes, we can study systems containing only one SH, which we shall refer
to as one-SH systems.
• In the second category, SHs do not perform key management. Instead, there
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is a KDC that manages keys for all users. This KDC can be the service
provider or a trusted third party. The systems containing many SHs are
referred to as multiple-SH systems.
In one-SH systems, the TMKM tree consists of user-subtrees and a BS subtree. In
multiple-SH systems, the TMKM tree consists of user-subtrees, BS-subtrees and a
SH subtree.
In this section, we introduce a model describing the joining and leaving behavior
of the users, and a flexible tree structure that can be used to design the user and
BS subtrees. We then examine the optimization of the user and BS subtrees and
the design of the SH subtree.
2.6.1 Dynamic membership model
Mlisten [49] is a tool that can collect the join/leave times for multicast group
members in MBone sessions. Using this tool, [50] [51] studied the characteristics
of the membership dynamics of MBone multicast sessions and showed that the user
arrival process can be modeled as Poisson and the membership duration of short
sessions (that usually last several hours) is accurately modeled using an exponen-
tial distribution while the membership duration of long sessions (that usually last
several days) is accurately modeled using the Zipf distribution [52]. Based on the
population model of short MBone sessions, we made the following assumptions on
the membership dynamics:
1. Under the lth SH, the user’s arrival process is Poisson with rate λl and the
service duration is governed by an exponential random variable with mean
1/µl, where l = 1, 2, · · · , nsh.
2. A user’s joining and leaving behavior is independent of other users.
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Figure 2.6: ALX tree
Based on the first assumption, the number of users under the lth SH is a Poisson




e−θl , where θl = λl/µl [53]. In addi-
tion, it can be shown that Gl(k) approximately equals to k ·µl. It is noted that the
second assumption is reasonable in some types of multicast services, such as peri-
odic news multicast, while it may not be correct for services such as a scheduled
pay-per-view multicast, where different users are related with each other through
watching the same content.
In this work, we use this Poisson arrival and exponential service duration model
to optimize the TMKM tree. In Section 2.7, we will use simulations to demon-
strate that the performance of the TMKM tree is not sensitive to users’ statistical
membership models.
2.6.2 ALX tree structure
The TMKM scheme matches the key tree to the network topology by decomposing
the key tree into user subtrees, BS subtrees, and SH subtrees. The TMKM scheme
does not have constraints on the specific structure of these subtrees. In this section,
we propose a tree structure that is capable of handling membership additions,
deletions, or relocations with minimal changes to the tree’s structure.
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As illustrated in Figure 2.6 and parameterized by the triple (a, L,x), this
(a, L,x)-logical tree has L + 1 levels. The upper L levels, which comprise a full
balanced subtree with degree a, are fixed during the multicast service. The users
are represented by the leaf nodes on the (L + 1)st level. We use a vector x to
describe the (L + 1)st level, where xi is the number of users attached to the i
th
node of the Lth level, and i = 1, 2, · · · , aL. In the example shown in Figure 2.6,
x = [4, 2, 3, 3, 2, 4, 3, 3, 3], a = 3 and L = 3. We will refer to this tree structure as
the ALX tree.
When using the ALX tree, the joining user is always put on the branch with
the smallest value of xi. The maximum number of users on an ALX tree is not
restricted. When a user leaves, the average rekeying message size is ( k
aL
− 1 + aL),
where k is the number of users on the ALX tree. When the user’s arrival process is
Poisson with rate λ, and the service time is an exponential random variable with
mean 1/µ, the probability that a user leaves the key tree is approximately k · µ,
and the pmf of k is p(k) = θ
k
k!
e−θ, where θ = λ/µ. The performance of the ALX
tree is evaluated by the expected value of the rekeying message size, denoted by




p(k) · k · µ · ( k
aL
− 1 + aL), (2.8)




Balanced trees whose degree is pre-determined, such as binary and trinary
trees, are widely used to design key trees [3, 18]. Next, we compare the ALX tree
structure with balanced trees that have a pre-defined degree, which we refer to as
fixed-degree trees in this section.
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Adding or removing a user from balanced fixed-degree trees often requires split-
ting or merging nodes. For example, when a new user is added to the key tree
shown in Figure 1.1, one leaf node must be split to accommodate the joining user.
In this case, a new KEK is created and must be transmitted to at least one existing
user. When using the ALX tree structure, however, no new KEKs are created dur-
ing membership changes. We know that updating existing KEKs for user join can
be achieved without sending any rekeying messages, as suggested in [18], because
existing users can update KEKs using one-way functions after being informed of
the need to update their keys. Therefore, the ALX tree structure allows for a key
updating operation that does not require sending any rekeying messages during
user joins. In addition, the ALX tree introduces minimal change to the tree struc-
ture with dynamic membership and therefore is easy to implement and analyze.
On the other hand, the ALX tree is optimized over the distribution of the
group size. If we take individual snapshots of the system when the group size is
very small or large, the ALX tree may not perform as well as fixed degree trees
that adjust themselves according to the group size. However, we will derive the
performance lower bound for fixed degree trees and then demonstrate that the cost
for ALX trees, C̃alx, is in fact very close to this lower bound. Similar to (2.8), the
expected rekeying message size when using a tree with fixed degree n, denoted by




p(k) · k · µ(n− 1 + n · (P − 1)) ,
where P is the average length of branches for a tree with k leaves and degree n.
It is well known that P equals the expected codeword length of a source code
containing k symbols with equal probability. The bounds on P are known to be
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ALX Tree Cost vs Lower Bound of the fixed degree tree





































Figure 2.7: Comparison between the ALX tree performance and the lower bound
for different user joining rates




p(k) · k · µ · (n logn(k)− 1). (2.10)






p(k) · k · µ · (n logn(k)− 1). (2.11)
It is noted that no fixed degree trees can reach this lower bound. In fact, C̃fix
would be achieved if and only if we could (1) reorganize the tree immediately after
user join or departure in such a way that the rekeying message size for the next
user join/leave operation is minimized; and (2) reorganize the tree without adding
any extra communication cost. However, reorganizing trees, such as splitting or
merging nodes, requires sending extra keying information to users. These above
two conditions can never be achieved simultaneously.
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ALX vs Lower Bound




































Figure 2.8: Comparison between the ALX tree performance and the lower bound
for different average service duration
The lower bound in (2.11) is used as a reference for evaluating the performance
of the ALX tree. In Figure 2.7, C̃fix and C̃alx are compared for different user
joining rates, λ. In Figure 2.8, C̃fix and C̃alx are compared for different average
service duration, 1/µ. We observe that the relative difference between the lower
bound and the performance of the ALX tree is less than 3.5%.
The ALX tree has the advantage of maintaining tree structure as user join
and leaves, while its performance is very close to the lower bound of fixed degree
trees. Although the ALX tree is not the optimal solution amongst all possible
tree structures, its practical nature makes the ALX tree an ideal candidate for
designing the user and BS subtrees.
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2.6.3 User subtree design
The user subtrees are designed as ALX trees. Under the lth SH, the optimal tree






where a and L are positive integers and Gl(k) ≈ kµl. Let T uw(k, i) and T uwl(k, i)
respectively represent the expected value of the wireline-message-size and wireless-
message-size caused by updating keys on the user subtrees, given that k users are
under the lth SH, one of them leaves and he is on i WTBR lists. We can show that
T uw(k, i) = T
u
wl(k, i) = (
k/nlbs
aL
− 1 + aL)i.








wl(k, i) + α
l
1(1− γ)T uw(k, i))





− 1 + aL)E[I l], (2.13)








2 are defined in Section 2.2. By substituting










− 1 + aL). (2.14)
The optimum a and L can be obtained by searching the space of possible a and L
values.
2.6.4 BS subtree design
We also design BS subtrees as ALX trees. We denote the degree and the level of
a BS subtree by abs and Lbs, respectively. Let T
b




denote the expected value of the wireline-message-size and wireless-message-size
caused by key updating on the BS subtree under the lth SH given the condition
Dk,l and the condition that the departing member is on i WTBR lists. We can
show that:
T bw(k, i) = s ·B(absLbs , i, s) +
Lbs∑
m=1
abs ·B(absLbs−m, i, s · ambs) (2.15)










. Equation (2.15) and (2.16) are derived based on the following
intermediate results:
• On average, B(absLbs−m, i, s · ambs) keys need to be updated on level (Lbs−m)
of the BS subtree.
• To update one KEK at level Lbs, the average message size is (s) and these
messages are broadcast to an average of (s) BSs. To update one KEK at level
(Lbs−m),m > 0, the message size is (abs) and these messages are broadcast
by (ambs) BSs.
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where nlbs is the number of BSs under the l
th SH. In practice, it is difficult to obtain
an analytic expression for plh(i) that depends on the statistical behavior of the users
during membership joins and departures, as well as their mobility behavior and
how handoffs are addressed. Thus, we introduce random variable Ĩ l, which is the
number of cells that a leaving user has ever visited. Obviously, Ĩ l ≥ I l. The
pmf of Ĩ l, denoted by p̃lh(i) , can be derived from user mobility behavior and the
distribution of the service duration, as described in Appendix B. Let Ãl2 denote
the right hand side value in (2.17) when replacing plh(i) by p̃
l
h(i). We can show
that Ãl2 is an upper bound of A
l
2. We notice that Ã
l
2 is not a function of k.
As discussed in Section 2.5, the parameters of the BS subtree under the lth SH




l(k) is not a function of
abs and Lbs, minimizing
∑
k p
l(k)Gl(k)Al2 is equivalent to minimizing A
l
2. Due to
the unavailability of plh(i), we choose the parameter of the BS subtrees under the




2.6.5 SH subtree design
In a typical cellular network, each SH administrates a large area where both the
user dynamics and the network conditions may differ significantly from the areas
administered by other SHs. The heterogeneity among the SHs should be considered
in designing the SH subtree. Due to SH heterogeneity, the ALX tree structure,
which treats every leaf equally, is not an appropriate tree structure to build the
SH subtree. Instead, the SH heterogeneity may be addressed by building a tree
where the SHs have varying path lengths from the root to their leaf node. In this








Figure 2.9: An example of the SH subtree
sub-optimal tree generation procedure.
The root of the SH subtree is the KDC, and the leaves are the SHs. The design








l(k)Gl(k). Let βl denote the communication cost of transmitting
one rekeying message to all the users under the lth SH. Based on the definition of
αl1 and α
l
2 in Section 2.2, it is easy to show that βl = (1− γ)αl1 + γnlbsαl2.
The value of Al3 can be calculated directly from βl where l = 1, 2, · · · , nsh. In
the simple example demonstrated in Figure 2.9, when a user under SH1 leaves the
multicast service, K00, K0, Kε and Ks, need to be updated. The communication
cost of updating K00 is 2(β1 + β2). The communication cost of updating K0 is
2(β1+β2+β3). The communication cost of updating Kε is 2(β1+β2+β3+β4+β5).
Since the communication cost of updating Ks does not depend on SH subtree
structure, it is not counted in the total communication cost. Then, we have:
A13 = 2(β1 + β2) + 2(β1 + β2 + β3) + 2(β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5).
The goal of the SH subtree design is to find a tree structure that minimizes Csh
given βl and ql. However, it is very difficult to do so based on (2.19). Thus, we
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),( 11 βα
),( 2121 ββαα ++
),( 22 βα
),( 33 βα ),( 44 βα ),( 55 βα
),( 5454 ββαα ++
),( 5151 ββαα +⋅⋅⋅++⋅⋅⋅+
),( 321321 βββααα ++++
Figure 2.10: The cost pairs on the SH subtree
compute Csh in a different way.
We assume that the SH subtree has the fixed degree n. We shall assign a cost
pair, which is a pair of positive numbers, to each node on the tree as follows. The
cost pair of the leaf node that represents the lth SH is (ql, βl). The cost pair of the
intermediate nodes are the element-wise summation of their children nodes’ cost
pairs, as illustrated in Figure 2.10. The cost pairs of all intermediate nodes are
represented by (xm, ym), where m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , and M is the total number of




xm · ym. (2.20)
It is easy to verify that (2.20) is equivalent to (2.19). Based on (2.20), we propose
a tree construction method for n = 2 as
1. Label all the leaf nodes using their cost pairs, and mark them to be active
nodes.
2. Choose two active nodes, (xi, yi) and (xj, yj), such that (xi + xj) · (yi + yj)
is minimized among all possible pairs of active nodes. Mark those two nodes
to be inactive and merge them to generate a new active node with the cost
pair (xi + xj, yi + yj).
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3. Repeat step 2 until there is only one active node left.
This method, which we call the greedy-SH subtree-design (GSHD) algorithm, can
be easily extended to n > 2 cases. We can prove that the GSHD algorithm produces
the optimal solution when β1 = β2 = · · · βnsh , but is not optimal in general cases.
Since the optimization problem for the SH-subtree is non-linear, combinatorial, and
even does not have a closed expression for the objective function, we do not seek
the optimal SH subtree structure in this work. In Section 2.7, we will compare




We first compare the performance of the TMKM tree and the TIKM tree in one-
SH systems by both analysis and simulations. Similar to [55, 56], we employ a
homogeneous cellular network that consists of 12 concatenated cells, and wrap
the cell pattern to avoid edge effects. We use the mobility model proposed in [57],
where R denotes the radius of the cells, and Vmax denotes the maximum speed of the
mobile users. Since the wireless connection usually experiences a high transmission
error rate and the number of users under one BS is larger than the number of BSs,
the wireless communication cost of the multicast communication is assigned a
larger weight than the wireline communication cost, i.e. γ > 0.5.
For the purpose of fair comparison, the TIKM tree is designed as an ALX
tree, which is optimized for the statistics of the number of participating users.
The wireline cost of the TIKM tree, denoted by Ctikmwire , is computed using (2.8),
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Figure 2.11: (a) The total message size as a function of the wireless weight; (b)
Performance ratio as a function of the wireless weight
where p(k) denotes the pmf of the number of users in the multicast service. The
wireless cost of the TIKM tree is computed as Ctikmwireless = nbsC
tikm
wire , where nbs
is the total number of BSs. In one-SH systems, the total communication cost is
CtikmT = γC
tikm
wireless + (1− γ)Ctikmwire . We define the performance ratio η as the total
communication cost of the TMKM tree divided by the total communication cost
of the TIKM tree, i.e. η = CtmkmT /C
tikm
T . When η is less than 1, the TMKM tree
has smaller communication cost than the TIKM tree, and smaller η indicates an
improved advantage that the TMKM tree has over the TIKM tree.
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Figure 2.12: (a) Performance ratio for different user join rate; (b) Performance
ratio for different users’ maximum speed.
Figure 2.11(a) shows the total communication cost of the TMKM tree and the
TIKM tree for different wireless weights (γ), when the cellular cells have a radius of
4 miles, the maximum mobile speed is 50 miles/hour, and the user joining rate is 16
users per minute per cell. The corresponding performance ratio is shown in Figure
2.11(b). In this simulation, two models are used to describe users’ join/departure
behavior. The first one, representing short sessions, uses a Poisson arrival and
exponential service time duration model. The second one, representing long ses-
sions, uses a Poisson arrival and Zipf service time duration model. The users stay
in the service for an average of 20 minutes in both cases. Three observations are
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made. First, the communication cost of the TMKM tree is always less than 42%
of the communication cost of the TIKM tree. Second, the performance ratio η is
smaller for larger γ, which supports the argument in Section 2.4 that the advantage
of the TMKM tree is larger when more emphasis is placed on the wireless cost.
Third, when the wireless transmission is the bottleneck of the system, i.e. γ = 1,
the TMKM tree can reduce the communication burden by as much as 65%, i.e.
η = 35%. In addition, two models yield similar results, which indicates that the
performance of the TMKM is not sensitive to the models. In the remainder of this
section, we adopt the short session model.
Figure 2.12(a) shows both the analysis and the simulation results of η for differ-
ent user join rates (λ) when the radius of the cellular cells is 4 miles, the maximum
mobile speed is 50 miles per hour, the average service time (1/µ) is 20 minutes,
and γ = 2/3. Since the exact expression for the pmf of I l is not available, to
calculate analytical results, we use an empirically estimated pmf of I l, which is
obtained from simulations with the same user join/departure and mobility mod-
els. We can see that the advantage of the TMKM tree is larger when the system
contains more users. This property can be verified by studying the cost functions
derived in the previous sections. In Figure 2.12(b), the performance ratio is shown
for different Vmax when the user joining rate is 16 users per minute per cell. The
performance ratio is an increasing function of Vmax when other parameters are
fixed since handoffs occur more frequently as users move faster.
2.7.2 Multiple-SH systems
As discussed in Section 2.6, when the system contains multiple SHs that do not per-
form key management, the design of the TMKM tree should consider the topology
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Figure 2.13: Comparison among SH subtree design methods
of the SHs.
SH subtree design methods
In this section, we compare the GSHD algorithm with the optimal tree obtained
by exhaustive search, and with a balanced tree that treats each SHs equally and
represents traditional key management schemes. We assume that half of the {βl}
are uniformly distributed between 1 and 20, which represent rural areas, and the
other half of {βl} uniformly distributed between 101 and 120, which represent
metropolitan areas. We also assume that ql, which is defined in Section 2.6.5
and represents the probability of a user leaving, is proportional to βl, where l =
1, 2, · · · , nsh. Here, {ql} are normalized such that ∑ ql = 1. In Figure 2.13, the
communication cost caused by updating keys on SH-subtrees, Csh, is shown when
using different SH subtrees. Results are averaged over 500 realizations. Since
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Figure 2.14: Performance comparison in multiple-SH systems with identical SHs
exhaustive search is very computationally expensive, it is only done for 10 and
fewer SHs. The simulation results indicate that the performance of the GSHD is
very close to optimal. Compared with the balanced tree, GSHD algorithm reduces
the communication cost contributed by the SH subtree by up to 18%.
Performance of TMKM trees and TIKM trees in multiple-SH systems
For the TMKM trees in multiple-SH systems, we designed the user-subtrees and
BS-subtrees as ALX trees, while the SH-subtrees were constructed using the GSHD
algorithm. We simulated a multiple-SH system where each SH administers 12
concatenated identical cells. The SH-subtrees are constructed as binary trees.
We first study a simple case where the user statistics and network conditions are
identical under all SHs. In this case, αl1’s and α
l
2’s are set to be 1. The radius of
the cells is R = 4 miles, the maximum velocity is Vmax = 50 miles/hr, and we also
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The number of SHs
 1/µ = 30 min. , λ = 10 users/cell/min, Vmax = 50 miles/hr, R = 4 miles
simulation
analysis
Figure 2.15: Performance comparison in multiple-SH systems with non-identical
SHs
choose µl = 1/30 and λl = 10 for all SHs.
In Figure 2.14, the wireless cost and the wireline cost of the TMKM trees
and the TIKM tree are shown for different quantities of participating SHs. We
observed that the TMKM trees have both smaller wireless cost and smaller wireline
costs than the TIKM trees when the number of SHs are equal or greater than 2,
and the advantages of the TMKM trees are more significant when the system
contains more SHs, which verifies the analysis in Section 2.4. In addition, the
corresponding performance ratio is drawn in Figure 2.15 for γ = 2/3. In this
system, the communication cost of the TMKM trees can be as low as 20% of the
communication cost of the TIKM trees. This indicates an 80% reduction in the
communication cost.
A more complicated system containing 5 SHs with different user joining rates
was also simulated. In this scenario, the λl values for the five SHs were set to 5, 10,
15, 20 and 25 respectively, and R = 4 miles, Vmax = 50 miles/hr, and µl = 1/20
for all SHs. The TMKM tree structure is shown in Figure 2.16. The TIKM tree
is simply an ALX tree with degree 3 and level 6. In this system, the wireless cost


















































Figure 2.16: A TMKM tree containing 5 SHs
TMKM tree is 34.0% of that of the TIKM tree. When the wireless weight γ is set
to 2/3, the TMKM tree reduced total communication cost by 74%.
In this chapter, we described a topology-aware multicast key management
scheme for mobile wireless environment. Compared with traditional tree-based
key management schemes that are independent of network topology, the proposed
TMKM scheme achieved a significant reduction in the communication burden asso-
ciated with rekeying. The proposed key tree consists of user-subtrees, BS-subtrees
and SH-subtrees. We proved that the problem of optimizing the communication
cost for the TMKM tree is separable and can be solved by optimizing each of
those subtrees separately. This property greatly reduced the complexity in key
tree design. The ALX tree structure, which easily adapts to changes in the num-
ber of users, was introduced to build user-subtrees and BS-subtrees. The GSHD
algorithm, which considers the network heterogeneity where the SHs administer
areas with varying network conditions, was introduced to build the SH subtree.
An efficient handoff scheme was introduced to address the consequences that user
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mobility has upon the TMKM tree. Both simulations and analysis demonstrated
that the proposed TMKM scheme can significantly reduces the communication
cost. In addition, the communication cost of the TMKM tree scales better than






Many group communications involve multiple data streams and group members
with various access privileges. This type of group communication prevails in mul-
timedia applications that often distribute data in multi-layer coding format [38],
in multicast applications containing several related services, and in hierarchical
managed organizations.
Traditional multicast key management schemes are not designed to handle key
management issues associated with multiple services occurring concurrently that
have correlated memberships. New key management scheme need to be designed
that exploit the overlap in the memberships of different data streams, while in-
corporating new functionalities that are not present in conventional multicast key
management. Specifically, it is necessary to introduce new rekeying events that
allow users to subscribe or cancel membership to some layers while maintaining
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their membership to others.
As discussed in Section 1.4, the straightforward approach to achieve hierarchical
access control is to associate a separate key tree with each data stream. The
advantage of such a scheme lies primarily in the simplicity of implementation: on
the server side separate trees are maintained for separate data stream, while on
the client side the user need only store keys for the data he is consuming. This
scheme, however, makes inefficient use of keys and does not scale well when there
are many data streams or more complicated access relationship.
There are limited works that have addressed the dynamic group membership
issues for certain special access scenarios. In [58], tree based traditional key man-
agement scheme is modified to fit the Bell-LaPedulla [59] confidentiality model.
These schemes, however, cannot be generalized to solve more complicated hierar-
chical access control problems.
In this chapter, we present a multi-group key management scheme that main-
tains the keying material for all members with different access privileges using an
integrated key graph. In particular, the hierarchical group access control prob-
lem is formulated in Section 3.2. The centralized multi-group key management is
presented in Section 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Particularly, Section 3.3 describes the con-
struction of the integrated key graph and the rekey algorithm. Section 3.4 analyzes
the performance of the proposed scheme and the asymptotical behavior. Section
3.5 provides the simulation results and compares the proposed scheme with exist-
ing tree-based solutions in various application scenarios. Finally, the contributory
key management scheme that uses the integrated key graph is presented in Section
3.6.
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3.2 Hierarchical Access Control for Group Com-
munications
3.2.1 System description
Let R = {r1, r2, · · ·} denote the set of resources in the system. In the group
communication scenario, the data of each resource are transmitted in one multicast
session, which is associated with a multicast address and a multicast routing tree
[2]. Thus, each resource corresponds to one multicast data stream. From data
transmission points of view, a Data Group (DG) is defined as a set of users who
have access to a resource. Thus, the users belonging to the same multicast session
form a DG. It is clear that the DGs may have overlapped membership because
users may subscribe multiple resources. From access control points of view, a
Service Groups (SG) is defined as a set of users who can access the exactly same
set of resources. SGs do not have overlapped membership. In this chapter, the
DGs are denoted by {D1, D2, · · · , DM}, where M is the total number resources,
and the SGs are denoted by {S1, S2, · · · , SI}, where I is the total number SGs. It
is easy to prove that I ≤ 2M − 1.
The access relationship between the resources and the SGs is usually described
by capability lists, which record the set of resources that can be accessed by each
SG. Here are two examples illustrating typical access relationship in group com-
munication.
Example 1. Multimedia applications distributing data in multi-layer format [38].
• Resources : {base layer (r1), enhancement layer 1 (r2), enhancement layer 2
(r3)}.
59
• Service Groups : {users subscribing basic quality (S1), users subscribing mod-
erate quality (S2), users subscribing high quality (S3)}.
• Capability lists : S1 access {r1}; S2 access {r1, r2}; S3 access {r1, r2, r3}.
Example 2. Multicast programs containing several related services.
• Resources : {News (r1), Stock quote (r2), Traffic/Weather (r3)}.
• Service Groups : Users can subscribe any combination of the resources. Thus,
there are total 7 SGs, denoted by S1, S2, · · · , S7.
• Capability lists : S1 access {r1}; S2 access {r2}; S3 access {r3}; S4 access
{r1, r2}; S5 access {r1, r3}; S6 access {r2, r3}; S7 access {r1, r2, r3}.
Besides capability list, access matrix is also used to describe the access rela-
tionship. In particular, the element on the ith row and mth column of the access





1, if the SG Si can access the resource rm
0, otherwise
,
where i = 1, · · · , I and m = 1, · · · ,M .




ai,m · n(Si), (3.1)
where n(Si) is the number of users in SG Si and n(Dm) is the number of users in
DG Dm.
3.2.2 Security requirements
Group communication often involves dynamic membership. In the applications
containing multiple multicast sessions, users not only join or leave service, as
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addressed in the single multicast session scenario, but also may switch between
the SGs by subscribing or dropping data streams. It is noted that the users’
join/departure/switching behaviors are associated with the changes in their per-
sonal access privilege but do not affect the access relationship between the SGs
and the resources.
We introduce the notation Si → Sj that represents a user switching from the
SG Si to the SG Sj. To simplify future notations, S0 is defined as a virtual
service group containing users who cannot access any resources. Thus, S0 → Si
represents a user joining the SG Si, and Si → S0 represents a user leaving the
group communication from the SG Si.
Similar as the single session access control problem addressed by traditional key
management schemes [3], the hierarchical group access control should guarantee
the following security requirements.
• The users in the SG Si have and only have access to the resources {rm,∀ m :
ai,m = 1}.
• When a user Si → Sj,
– This user cannot access the future content of the resources {rm,∀ m :
ai,m = 1 and aj,m = 0}. This property can be referred to as the forward
secrecy [31].
– This user cannot access the previous content of the resources {rm,∀ m :
ai,m = 0 and aj,m = 1}. This property can be referred to as the back-
ward secrecy [31].
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3.2.3 Data encryption and hierarchical key management
In hierarchical access control scenario, there are two ways to encrypt and distribute
multicast data. In the first method, resources are encrypted using separate keys,
which are called Data Group Keys. The data group key used to encrypt resource
rm, denoted by K
D
m , is shared among the users in DG Dm. In this case, each
resource is distributed in a single multicast session, and the users may subscribe
to one or several multicast sessions according to their access privilege. The task of
key management is to securely update and distribute {KDm , ∀m : ai,m = 1} to the
users in Si, where i = 1, 2, · · · , I.
In the second method, the users in each SG share a secrete key called the Service
Group Key and the multicast sessions are formed based on SGs. In particular, the
users in Si share the service group key K
S
i and form one multicast session. In
this multicast session, the resources {rm,∀m : ai,m = 1} are encrypted by KSi and
transmitted to the users in Si. In this case, one resource may be distributed in
several multicast sessions while being encrypted by different service group keys.
The task of key management is to securely distribute and update KSi for the users
in SG Si. Compared with the first method, this method obviously consumes more
bandwidth for data transmission. On the other hand, since users subscribe to only
one multicast session, the task of key management for the second method can be
solved by applying traditional key management for each SG separately.
In this work, the first encryption method is adopted because of its bandwidth ef-
ficiency. In order to guarantee forward and backward secrecy, when a user switches
from SG Si to Sj, it is necessary to
• update {KDm ,∀ m : ai,m = 0 and aj,m = 1}, such that this user cannot access
the previous communication in corresponding DGs;
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• and update {KDm ,∀ m : ai,m = 1 and aj,m = 0}, such that this user cannot
access the future communication in corresponding DGs.
The focus of this work is to solve this hierarchical group key management problem
efficiently.
3.3 Centralized Multi-group Key Management
Scheme
Hierarchical group access control can be achieved in either centralized or contribu-
tory manner. While the contributory solution will be discussed in Section 3.6, this
section and the following two sections will be dedicated to the centralized schemes.
3.3.1 Employing independent key trees to achieve hierar-
chical access control
To reduce the communication, computation and storage overhead, tree structure
is widely used in centralized key management schemes to maintain the keying
material and coordinate the key generation [4,16–21] (see Section 4.2.3 and 1.3.2).
When using tree-based schemes to achieve hierarchical group access control, a
separate key tree must be constructed for each DG, with the root being the data
group key and the leaves being the users in this DG. This approach is referred to
as the Independent-tree key management scheme, and is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
This scheme does not exploit the relationship among the subscribers and makes
inefficient use of keys because of the overlapped DG membership. As an extreme
example, if a user who subscribes all data streams leaves the service, key updating
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Figure 3.1: Independent-tree key management scheme for layered coded multime-
dia service
3.3.2 Multi-group key management scheme
To achieve hierarchical group access control, we propose a multi-group key manage-
ment scheme that employs one integrated key graph accommodating key materials
of all users. This key graph consists of several subtrees, and is constructed in three
steps.
Step1: For each SG Si, construct a subtree having the leaf nodes as the private
keys of users in Si and the root node as the service group key K
S
i . These
subtrees are referred to as the SG-subtrees.
Step2: For each DG Dm, construct a subtree whose root is the DG key K
D
m and
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Figure 3.2: Multi-group key management graph construction
65
Step3: Generate the key graph by connecting the leaves of the DG-subtrees and
roots of SG-subtrees.
This 3-step procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.2 for the services containing 3 layers
and having 4 users in each SG. Some duplicated structures may appear on DG-
subtrees, and they can be merged to reduce the number of keys on the key graph.
In the example shown in Figure 3.2, KS3 and K
D
3 , which are on the same line, are
merged. The DG-subtrees of D2 and D1 have the same structure that connect K
S
2




3 on DG-subtree of D2 is merged
with KD2 .
This multi-group key graph can also be interpreted as M overlapped key trees,
each of which has KDm as the root and the users in DG Dm as the leaves. Obviously,
these M key trees can be used in the independent-tree scheme. This reveals the
fact that the multi-group key graph removes the ”redundancy” presented in the
independent-tree scheme. Therefore, it can reduce the overhead associated with
key updating.
As defined in [17], keyset refers to the set of keys associated with a edge node
on the key graph and possessed by the user located at this edge node. In our key
graph, the keyset of a user in SG Si is the keys on the pathes from himself to the
roots of the DG-subtrees of Dm for {m : ai,m = 1}. It is noted that the keyset of
users in S0 is just an empty set.
Besides user join and departure, the rekey algorithm in the multi-group key
management scheme must address users’ relocation on the key graph. We describe
the rekey algorithm for Si → Sj, which includes the cases for user join, departure,
and switching SGs. First, the switching user is moved from the SG-subtree of Si to
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Figure 3.3: User relocation on the key graph
the user’s previous position, and φj denote the keyset associated with the user’s
new position. Then,
• the KDC updates the keys in φi ∩ φj using one-way functions, similar as the
procedure for user join in [18],
• and, the KDC generates new versions of the keys in φi ∩ φj and distributes
these new keys encrypted by their children node keys from bottom to up,
similar as the procedure for user departure in [18].
We illustrate this rekey algorithm through an example. Let user 8 switches from
SG S2 to S1 (see Figure 3.3). On the SG-subtree of S1, the leaf node associated
with user 4 is split to accommodate user 8. Then, user 4 and 8 will share a
new KEK, denoted by K4−8. On the SG-subtree of S2, user 7 will be moved up
and occupy the node that is previously associated with K7−8. In this case, φ2 is
{K7−8, KS2 , KD2 , SK2, KD1 , SK1} and φ1 is {K4−8, K3−4, KS1 , KD1 , SK1}.
Let the notation xnew represent the new version of key x, {y}x represent the
key y encrypted by key x, and uk represent the private key of user k. Each key is
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associated with a ID, a version number and a revision number.
In this example, the KDC generates the new keys, Knew3−4 and K
S,new
1 , from the
old keys using a one-way function, and increases the revision numbers of those new
keys. Thus, the user 1,2,3,4 will know about the key change when the data packet
indicating the increase of the revision numbers first arrives, and compute the new
keys using the same one-way function. No rekeying messages are necessary for
distributing Knew3−4 and K
S,new
1 .




2 , and SK
new
2 , and
distributes them through a set of rekeying messages as:
{Knew4−8}u8 , {Knew4−8}u4 , {KS,new2 }K5−6 , {KS,new2 }u7
{KD,new2 }KS,new2 , {K
D,new
2 }KS3 , {SK
new
2 }KD,new2
In this case, the rekeying message size is 7.
It is noted that φi ∩φj may contain the new KEKs that are created for accom-
modating the switching user. These new KEKs are encrypted by users’ private
keys and distributed through rekeying messages. In addition, φi ∩ φj may con-
tain KEKs that do not exist any more after the relocation of the switching user.
Obviously, these keys are discarded.
3.4 Performance Measures and Analysis
Communication, computation and storage overhead associated with key updating
are major performance criteria for key management schemes [3, 4, 17]. In the
hierarchical access control scenario, we define the performance measures as:
• Storage overhead at the KDC : denoted by RKDC and defined as the expected
number of keys stored at the KDC.
68
• Rekey overhead at the KDC : denoted by MKDC and defined as the expected
amount of rekeying messages transmitted by the KDC.
• Storage overhead of users : denoted by Ru∈Si and defined as the expected
number of keys stored by the users in SG Si.
• Rekey overhead of users : denoted by Mu∈Si and defined as the expected
amount of rekeying messages received by the users in SG Si.
Here, RKDC and Ru∈Si describe the storage overhead, while MKDC and Mu∈Si
reflect the usage of communication and computation resources.
3.4.1 Storage overhead
We first consider the storage overhead of a single key tree. Similar to most key
management schemes [3, 4, 16–18], the key tree investigated in this work is fully
loaded and maintained as balanced as possible by putting the joining users on the
shortest branches.
Let fd(n) denote the length of the branches and rd(n) denote the total number
of keys on the key tree when the key tree has degree d and accommodates n users.
Since the key tree is balanced, fd(n) is either L0 or L0 + 1, where L0 = blogd nc.
Particularly,
• the number of users who are on the branches with length L0 is dL0−dn−dL0d−1 e,
• and, the number of users who are on the branches with length L0 + 1 is
n− dL0 + dn−dL0
d−1 e.
Thus, the total number of keys on this key tree is calculated as:
rd(n) = n + 1 +
dL0 − 1
d− 1 + d
n− dL0
d− 1 e. (3.2)
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d−1 e < n−d
L0
d−1 + 1, we have
dE[n]− 1
d− 1 + 1 ≤ E[rd(n)] <
dE[n]− 1
d− 1 + 2, (3.3)
where the expectation, E[.], is taken over the distribution of n(Dm) and the length
of the branches on the key trees. The left-hand-side equality is achieved when
logd(n) is an integer. In addition, since logd(n) is a concave function andblogd nc ≤
logd n, it is clear that
E[fd(n)] ≤ E[logd n] + 1 ≤ logd E[n] + 1. (3.4)
With (3.3) and (3.4), we are ready to analyze the storage overhead. When
using the separate key trees (i.e. independent-tree scheme), the KDC stores all
keys on total M key trees, and users in Si store subsets of keys on the key trees








ai,m (E[fd(n(Dm))] + 1) . (3.6)
In the multi-group key management scheme, the DG-subtree of Dm has cm =
∑
i ai,m leaf nodes. Before removing the redundancy on DG-subtrees, there are
in total
∑M
m=1 rd(cm) keys on DG-subtrees. Also, the total number of keys on
the SG-subtrees is
∑I
i=1 rd(n(Si)). Merging duplicated structures of DG-subtrees
can future reduce the number of keys on the key graph. Therefore, the storage







E [rd(cm)] . (3.7)
A user in SG Si stores fd(n(Si)) keys on the SG-subtree and up to
∑M
m=1 ai,m(fd(cm)+
1) keys on the DG-subtrees. Therefore, the users’ storage overhead of the multi-
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group scheme is:
Rmgu∈Si ≤ E[fd(n(Si))] +
M∑
m=1
ai,m(E[fd(cm)] + 1). (3.8)
We will demonstrate the storage overhead of the independent-tree and the
multi-group key management in the applications containing multiple layers, as
described in Example 1 in Section 3.2.1. In this case, ai,m = 1 for m ≤ i and
ai,m = 0 for m > i. We also assume that each layer contains the same amount of
users, denoted by n(Si) = n0. Thus, n(Dm) = (M −m + 1)n0. Using (3.6) and




(E[fd((M −m + 1) · n0)] + 1) , (3.9)
Rmgu∈Si ≤ E[fd(n0)] +
i∑
m=1
(E[fd(M −m + 1)] + 1) . (3.10)
When the group size is large, i.e. n0 →∞, (3.4)(3.9) and (3.10) lead to
Rindu∈Si ∼ O(i · log(n0)), Rmgu∈Si ∼ O(log(n0)). (3.11)




E[rd(m · n0)], (3.12)













d− 1M · n0). (3.15)
By using the integrated key graph instead of the separate key trees, the multi-
group key management scheme reduces the storage overhead of both the KDC and
71
the users. As indicated in (3.14) and (3.15), the storage advantage of the proposed
scheme becomes larger when the system contains more SGs, i.e. requiring more
levels of access control. The proposed scheme in fact scales better when the number
of layers (M) increases.
3.4.2 Rekey overhead
In this section, we calculate the amount of rekeying messages transmitted by the
KDC when one user switches from Si to Sj, denoted by Ci,j. It is noted that the
rekey overhead, MKDC and Mu∈Si , can be calculated from Ci,j, as long as the users’
statistical joining/leaving/switching model is given.
Switching from Si to Sj is equivalent to adding the subscription to the DG
{Dm,∀m : ai,m = 0 and aj,m = 1} and dropping the subscription to the DG
{Dm,∀m : ai,m = 1 and aj,m = 0}. When using the tree-based key management




max(ai,m − aj,m, 0) · (d · fd(n(Dm))) . (3.16)
We can see that the term (max(ai,m− aj,m, 0)) equals to 1 only when ai,m = 1 and
aj,m = 0. When this term equals to 1, d ·fd(n(Dm) rekeying messages are necessary
to update keys on the key tree associated with the DG Dm.
In the multi-group key management scheme, when a user switches from Si to
Sj and i 6= j,
• The amount of messages that update the keys on the SG-subtree of Si is up
to (d · fd(n(Si))− 1).
• The amount of messages that convey the KEK created for accommodating
the switching/join user on the SG-subtree of Sj is always less than 2.
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• If this user drops the subscription of the DG Dm, i.e. (max(ai,m−aj,m, 0)) =
1, the amount of rekeying messages that update keys on the DG-subtree of
Dm is up to (d · fd(cm) + 1).
• If this user remains the subscription of the DG Dm, i.e. ai,m = aj,m = 1, we
need up to (d · fd(cm)) rekeying messages to update keys on the DG-subtree
of Dm.
Therefore, when using the multi-group scheme and i 6= j, we have
Cmgij ≤
∑M
m=1 (max(ai,m − aj,m, 0) · (d · fd(cm) + 1)
+ ai,maj,md · fd(cm)) + d · fd(n(Si)) + 1, (3.17)
Similar as in Section 3.4.1, we analyze the rekey overhead in a multi-layer
scenario with n(Si) = n0. In this case, the rekeying message size for one user




d · E[fd((M −m + 1)n0)], (3.18)
Cmg0j ≤ d · E[fd(n0)] + 1 +
j∑
m=1
(d · E[fd(M −m + 1)] + 1) .
When n0 →∞, we can see that
Cind0j ∼ O(i · d · log(n0)), Cmg0j ∼ O(d · log(n0)). (3.19)
The comprehensive comparison between the proposed scheme and the independent-
tree scheme will be presented in Section 3.5.
3.5 Simulations and Performance Comparison
In this section, the proposed multi-group key management scheme is compared with
the existing tree-based key management schemes in various application scenarios.
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3.5.1 Statistical dynamic membership model
In [50] [51], it has been shown that the users’ arrival process and membership
duration of MBone multicast sessions can be modelled by Poisson and exponential
distribution respectively, in a short period of time. In this work, we use this Poisson
arrival and exponential distribution duration model, and assume that when a user
switches between SGs, the SG that he switches to depends only on his current SG.
Therefore, the users’ statistical behavior can be described by an embedded
Markov chain [53]. Particularly, there are a total of I + 1 states, denoted by
S̃i, i = 0, · · · , I. When a user is in the SG Si, he is in the state S̃i. After a user
enters state S̃i, i.e. subscribes or switches to SG Si, this user stays at state S̃i for
time Ti, which is governed by an exponential random variable. When time is up,
the user moves to state S̃j. The selection of S̃j only depends on the current state
S̃i and is not related to previous states.
In practice, it is usually not necessary to update keys immediately after mem-
bership changes. Many applications allow the join/departure users receive limited
previous/future communications [39]. For example, in video streaming applica-
tions, a joining user may receive a complete group-of-picture (GOP) [38] although
partial of this GOP already been transmitted before his subscription. Those situa-
tions prefer batch rekeying [39] that postpones key updating such that the rekeying
overhead is reduced by adding or removing several users altogether.
In this work, batch rekeying is implemented as updating keys periodically.
The time between key updates is fixed and denoted by Bt. For the users who
join/leave/switch SGs in the time interval ((k − 1)Bt, kBt], the key updating will
take place at time kBt, where k is a positive integer. From the key updating points

















Figure 3.4: Discrete Markov chain model for multi-layer applications.
model can be simplified as a discrete Markov chain model [53], as illustrated in
Figure 3.4. In this model,
• The transition matrix is denoted by P = [pij](I+1)×(I+1), where pij is the
probability that one user moves from SG Si to Sj in the time interval
(kBt, (k + 1)Bt] given that this user is in Si at time kBt.
• The n-step transition probability matrix is denoted by P (n), and obviously,
P (n) = PN . The element at the ith row and jth column of P (n) is denoted
by pij(n).
• The stationary state probability is a 1-by-(I + 1) vector, denoted by π =
[π0, π1, · · · , πI ].
In practice, most group applications have the following properties.
• p(n)0j 6= 0 for some positive finite n and for any j because users should be
able to subscribe to any SGs.
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• p(n)i0 6= 0 for some positive finite n and for any i because users should be
able to leave from any SGs.
• pii > 0 because users can always stay in his current SG.
• The mean recurrence time [53] of the state S̃0 is finite because the expected
time that a user stays in the group communication is finite.
Because of these properties, this Markov chain is irreducible, aperiodic and positive
recurrent. As a result, the stationary state probability mass function (pmf) exists
[53] and is the unique solution of
πP = π, and
∑
i
πi = 1 . (3.20)
3.5.2 Performance with different group size
We first study the applications containing multiple layers (see Example 1 in Section3.2.1)
where users in SG Si can access DG D1, D2, · · · , Di. In the simulation, the transi-
tion matrix is chosen as follows.
• Users join different SGs with the same probability, i.e. P0j = α, ∀j > 0.
• Users leave different SGs with the same probability, i.e. Pi0 = β, ∀i > 0.
• While a user is in the service, he adds/drops only one DG at a time, i.e.
Pi,j = 0,∀i, j > 0 and |i − j| > 1. Also, users switch between SGs with the
same probability, i.e. Pi,j = γ, ∀i, j > 0 and |i− j| = 1.
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Thus, the transition matrix is described by only three variables. For example,




1− 3α α α α
β 1− β − γ γ 0
β γ 1− β − 2γ γ
β 0 γ 1− β − γ


In all simulations, batch rekeying is applied and the key trees are binary. The
initial state is chosen as the stationary state, i.e. Si contains N0πi users at the
beginning of the service.
In Figure 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, the multi-group scheme and the independent-
tree scheme are compared for varying group size, N0. The results are averaged
over 300 realizations, and the number of layers is 4. In those simulations, we chose
α = 0.005, β = 0.01, and γ = 0.001.
Figure 3.5 shows that the storage overhead at the KDC, RKDC , increases lin-
early with the group size. This result can be verified by (3.3)(3.5) and (3.7). In
the case when M = 4, the multi-group scheme reduces RKDC by more than 50%.
Figure 3.6 shows that the users’ storage overhead, Ru∈Si , increases linearly with
the logarithm of the group size. This can be verified by (3.9) and (3.10). The users
who subscribe only one layer have the similar storage overhead in both schemes.
For the uses who subscribe multiple layers, the multi-group scheme results in less
storage overhead than the independent-tree scheme.
The KDC’s rekeying overhead, RKDC and the users’ rekey overhead, Ru∈Si are
shown in Figure 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. In both cases, the multi-group scheme
reduces the rekey overhead by more than 50%.
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Figure 3.5: Storage overhead at the KDC



















































Figure 3.6: Storage overhead at the users in each SG
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Figure 3.7: Rekey overhead at the KDC
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Figure 3.8: Rekey overhead at the users in each SG
3.5.3 Scalability
Next, we change the number of layers (M) while maintaining roughly the same
number of users in the service by choosing the join probability α as 0.02/M . The
values of β and γ are the same as those in Section 3.5.2.
Figure 3.9(a) and Figure 3.10(a) show the storage and rekey overhead at the
KDC, respectively. When M increases, the storage and rekey overhead of the
multi-group scheme do not change much, while the overhead of the independent-
tree scheme increases linearly with M . It is clear that the multi-group scheme
scales better when M increase. By removing the redundancy in DG membership,
the scale of the key graph mainly depends on the group size, not the number
of layers or services. On the other hand, by constructing M separate key trees,
the independent-tree scheme requires larger storage and rekey overhead when M
increases even when N0 is fixed.
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4  Storage overhead at KDC with different number of SGs(N0=15000)












































Figure 3.9: Storage overhead at the KDC with different number of SGs
Figure 3.9(b) shows that the ratio between RindKDC and R
mg
KDC increases linearly
with M , which agrees with (3.14) and (3.15). Similarly, the ratio between M indKDC
and MmgKDC increases linearly with M , as shown in Figure 3.10(b).
3.5.4 Performance with different transition probability
In the previous simulations, we set γ = 0.1β, which means that the users are
more likely to leave the service than to switch SGs. Figure 3.11 shows the rekey
overhead with different values of γ. Remember that γ describes the probability of
user switching between SGs. In this simulation, M = 4, N0 = 1000, and the values
of α and β are the same as those in the previous experiments.
When γ is very small, the multi-group scheme reduces the rekey overhead by
about 50%, as we have shown in the previous simulations. When γ is less than 2β,
the advantage of the multi-group scheme decreases with the increase of γ. This
is because the multi-group scheme introduces larger rekey overhead when users
switch SGs by simply subscribing more DGs. To see this, let a user move from
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Figure 3.10: Rekey overhead at the KDC with different number of SGs
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Figure 3.11: Rekey overhead at the KDC with different transition probability
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SG S1 to SG S2. When using the independent-tree scheme, this user only needs
to be added to the key tree associated with the DG D2 and no rekeying messages
are necessary. When using the multi-group scheme, we need to update keys on
the SG-subtree of S1 and the DG-subtree of D1. Therefore, the performance gain
reduces when more users tend to switch SGs.
When γ continues to increase, however, the rekey overhead of the multi-group
scheme decreases. Particularly, when γ = 0.45, which describes the scenario where
users are much more likely to switch SGs than to stay in the current SG or leave
the service, the performance gain of the multi-group scheme is about 50% again.
This phenomena is due to the fact that the size of the SG-subtree is greatly reduced
when a significant potion of users are switching away from this SG. In this case,
removing a large potion of users from the key tree using batch rekeying requires
less rekeying messages than just removing several users.
3.5.5 Simulation of multi-service applications
We also simulated the multi-service scenario illustrated in Example 2 (Section
3.2.1), which contains 3 DGs and 7 SGs. The users can subscribe any combination
of DGs and switch to any SGs. Here, the transition matrix is 8 by 8, with Pj0 =
0.01,∀j > 0 and Pi,j = 0.00017, ∀i, j > 0 and i 6= j. N0 is fixed to be 1500. The
values of P0i,∀i > 0, are adjusted such that the SGs contain varying number of
users while (
∑I
i=1 P0i) is maintained to be the same.
The horizontal axis in Figure 3.12 is the ratio between the number of users
subscribing more than one DGs and the number of users subscribing only one DG.
Larger is this ratio, more overlap is in DG membership. Figure 3.12 shows that the
advantages of the multi-group scheme is larger when more users subscribe multiple
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Figure 3.12: Rekey overhead at the KDC with unevenly loaded SGs in multi-service
applications
DGs.
3.6 Contributory Multi-group Key Management
The multi-group key management schemes can be extended to the contributory
environment by using the same graph construction procedure presented in Section
3.3.2. Similar as in the centralized environments, separate key trees for each DG
must be constructed when using existing tree-based contributory schemes [31–33],
and the multi-group contributory schemes maintains one integrated key graph for
all users.
The key establishment protocols are straightforward extensions from the exist-
ing protocols in tree-based contributory schemes [31–33]. When users join/leave/switch,
the set of keys that need to be recalculated is the same as that need to be updated
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Figure 3.13: The total number of rounds performed to establish the group key
in the protocols presented in Section 3.3.2. The new keys are recalculated by ap-
plying the DH protocol between the users who are under the left child node and
the users who are under the right child node from bottom to up.
For contributory key management schemes, the number of rounds is usually
used to measure the communication, computation, and latency [60] associated
with key establishment and updating [30–32].
With the same simulation setup as that in Section 3.5.2, the performance of
the independent-tree and multi-group contributory key management schemes are
compared for varying group size. Figure 3.13 shows the total number of rounds
to establish the group key, which reflects the latency in key establishment [60].
Figure 3.14 shows the number of rounds performed by the users in each SG, which
describes the users’ computation overhead. In each round, a user performs two
modular exponentiations. With the same simulation setup as that in Section 3.5.2,
Figure 3.15 shows the number of rounds for key updating for with different num-
ber of layers. Compared with the tree-based contributory schemes, the multi-group
contributory scheme significantly reduces the computation and latency associated
with key establishment and updating. The advantage of the multi-group contrib-
utory scheme is larger when M increases.
In this chapter, we designed a multi-group key management scheme that achieves
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Figure 3.14: The number of rounds performed by the users in each SG for key
establishment
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Figure 3.15: The number of rounds performed to establish the group key with
different number of SGs/layers
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hierarchical group access control in secure group communications, where multiple
data streams are distributed to group members with various access privileges. The
proposed multi-group key management scheme employs an integrated key graph to
maintain keying material, and uses a generalized rekey algorithm that allow users
subscribing/dropping the group communications as well as changing access lev-
els. Compared with traditional tree-based key management, the proposed scheme
can greatly reduce the communication, computation, and storage overhead associ-
ated key establishment and update. Further, when the system contains more data
streams, i.e. more complicated access relationship, the multi-group key manage-




Information in Secure Multicast
4.1 Introduction
In order to design better security protocols, it is necessary to look at the security
system from an adversarial point-of-view. By aggressively inspecting existing key
management protocols, we discovered a weakness that has been overlooked during
the design phase. That is, key management can disclose group dynamic infor-
mation (GDI) to both insiders and outsiders. In this work, the group dynamic
information particularly refers to a set of functions as:
• N(t): the number of users in the multicast group at time t.
• J(t0, t1): the number of users who join the service between time t0 and t1.
• L(t0, t1): the number of users who leave the service between time t0 and t1.
In many group communications, GDI is confidential and should not be disclosed
to either valid group members or outsiders. Such group applications widely exist in
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commercial as well as military applications, as discussed in Section 1.4. However,
to acquire GDI by launching attacks on the key management schemes can be
very simple as we will demonstrate. Instead of trying to break the encryption or
compromise the key distribution center, the adversaries can subscribe to the service
as regular users. In this case, they are referred to as the inside attackers. As we
will show later in this chapter, inside attackers can obtain very accurate estimation
of GDI by monitoring the messages conveying new key updating information, i.e.
rekeying messages. Even if the adversaries cannot become valid group members,
they still have the opportunities to steal GDI as outside attackers as long as they
can observe the traffic and distinguish the rekeying messages and other data.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the key management schemes can re-
veal the GDI easily and propose a framework of protecting GDI by introducing
anti-attack technologies to key management. In particular, the attack strategies
and the anti-attack method for the centralized schemes are presented in Section
4.2 and Section 4.3 respectively. In Section 4.4, the performance criteria of the
proposed anti-attack method are derived and the optimization problem is formu-
lated. Simulation results based on the user log data from real MBone sessions are
shown in Section 4.5. The investigation on contributory key management schemes
is presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 GDI Attacks on Centralized Key manage-
ment
In centralized key management schemes there usually exists a centralized server,
such as the service provider, who is trustful, well protected, and has the compu-
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tation and storage ability to generate and distribute the decryption keys [3]. In
this section, we investigate the attack strategies that aim to attack the central-
ized key management schemes for obtaining the dynamic group information. Two
attack strategies for tree-based key management will be presented, followed by a
discussion of vulnerability of other prevalent centralized key management schemes.
We consider a popular tree-based centralized key management scheme proposed
in [18], whose rekeying process has been shown in Section 4.2.3. In brief, when a
user leaves the group, all the keys on the path from this user to the root of the
key tree are updated by conveying a set of rekeying messages, that have the basic
format as one key encrypted by another key. When a user joins the group, all
existing users compute the new key using a one-way function upon noticing the
increased revision numbers of keys. No additional rekeying messages are necessary.
The rekeying procedure although has some differences, most tree-based central-
ized key management schemes [3, 4, 16–19] share two common properties. First,
group members can distinguish the key updating process due to user join and that
due to user departure. Second, rekeying message size is closely related with the
group size. Due to these properties, the attackers can estimate J(t0, t1) and L(t0, t1)
by examining the rekey processes, and estimate N(t) directly from the rekeying
messages size. Next, we illustrate these two types of attacks on the tree-based key
management scheme presented in [18].
4.2.1 Attack A1: Estimation of the number of join/departure
users by inside attackers
An inside attacker, like other regular users, processes Ks, Kε, and a set of KEKs.
He receives rekeying messages, decrypts the messages that are encrypted by his
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keys, and observes the rekeying message size without having to understand the
content of all messages. Since the key updating process for user join and the
process for user departure are different, he can estimate J(t0, t1) and L(t0, t1)
using the following strategy:
• When receiving the rekeying message containing Knewε encrypted by one of
his KEKs, he assumes that one user leaves the service.
• When observing the increase of the revision number of Kε, he assumes that
one user joins the service.
This strategy is effective when most users do not join/leave simultaneously and
the keys are updated immediately once each user join/departure. Otherwise, more
complicated techniques involving examining the rekeying message size shall be
used. When this attack is successful, N(t) can be calculated from J(t0, t1) and
L(t0, t1) as:
N(t1) = N(t0) + J(t0, t1)− L(t0, t1). (4.1)
Even if the attacker do not know the initial value of the group size, he obtains
the changing trend of the group size.
4.2.2 Attack AII: Estimation of group size from rekeying
message size
Besides using (4.1), the group size N(t) can also be estimated directly from the
rekeying message size. We will derive a Maximum Likelihood estimator for the
attackers and then demonstrate the effectiveness of this estimator through simu-
lations.
We assume that N(t) does not change much within a short period of time. In
this time period, there are W departure users who do not leave simultaneously.
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Thus, the attacker makes W observations of the rekeying message size due to single
user departure, denoted by Msg = {m1,m2, · · · ,mw}.
Similar to most key management schemes [3,4,16–18], the key tree investigated
in this work is fully loaded and maintained as balanced as possible by putting the
joining users on the shortest branches. In the worst-case scenario, the attacker
knows this property and the degree of the key tree, denoted by d. Then, the
attacker can calculate the depth of the branch where the ith leaving user was
located before departure, denoted by Li. Without losing information, the observed
Msg is converted to {L1 = l1, L2 = l2, · · · , LW = lW}, where li = dmi+1d e. Then,
the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator is formulated as:
NML = arg max
n
Prob{L1 = l1, L2 = l2, · · · , LW = lW |N(t) = n}. (4.2)
To solve (4.2), we introduce a set of new variables: {Sk}k=Lmin,Lmin+1,···,Lmax , where
Sk is the number of users who are on the branches with length k, Lmax is the




Sk = n. (4.3)




Lmax−bj ≤ dLmax , where bj is the length of the branch on which the
user j stays and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Thus, Sk, which equals to the number of elements




Lmax−k ≤ dLmax , (4.4)
It can be verified that the equality is achieved when all intermediate nodes on the
key tree have d children nodes. When the key tree is balanced and fully loaded, it
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Lmax−k = dLmax . (4.5)
We assume that the leaving users are uniformly distributed on the key tree, and
the number of users in the system is much larger than the number of leaving users,
i.e. N(t) >> W . Then, the probability mass function (pmf) of Li is
Prob{Li = k |n, Sk} = Sk
n
, k = Lmin, Lmin + 1, · · · , Lmax.
We assume that Li, i = 1, · · · ,W are i.i.d. random variables. Thus, the probability
in (4.2) is calculated as:








where h(k) denotes the number of elements in set {li : li = k} and obviously,
∑
k h(k) = W . Then, the values of n and {Sk} that maximize (4.6) under the








This ML estimator was applied to simulated multicast services. As suggested
in [50] [51], the user arrival process is modelled as poisson process, and the service
duration is modelled as an exponential random variable. In Figure 4.1(a), 4.1(b),
and 4.1(c), the estimated group size is obtained by using the estimator in (4.8),
and compared with the true values of N(t). These three plots are for different
simulation settings. The entire service period is divided into four sessions. The
model parameters, i.e. user arrival rate and average service time, are fixed within
each session and vary in different sessions. In the ith session, described by interval
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Estimate N(t) using ML estimator 
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Figure 4.1: Performance of the ML estimator
[ti−1, ti), the user arrival rate is λi and the average service time is µi. In all
three cases, [t0, t1, t2, t3, t4] is chosen to be [0, 200, 1600, 3200, 5000] minutes, and
the initial group size is 0. In plot (a), [λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4] = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.3]min
−1 and
[µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4] = [1400, 800, 600, 400]min. In plot (b), [λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4] is chosen as
[0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.5]min−1, and [µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4] is chosen as [1500, 1500, 1000, 800]min.
In plot (c), [λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4] is [0.3, 0.7, 0.1, 0.9]min
−1 and [µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4] is chosen as
[1400, 800, 600, 400]min. In addition, Figure 4.1(d) demonstrates the performance
of the ML estimator, when it was applied to a real MBone audio session, CBC
Newsworld on-line test, starting on Oct. 29. 1996 and lasted for about 5 days [61].
In all four cases, the changing trend of the group size is well captured by the
attacker. It is also observed that the estimated group size tends to be larger than
the true N(t), which is due to the approximation that we replace (4.5) by (4.4).
Although not perfect, this estimator is effective in helping the attackers to achieve
many of their goals, such as analyzing audience behavior and monitoring the group
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size changes.
The inside attackers can launch both attack AI and AII. They obtain J(t0, t1)
and L(t0, t1) using AI, and the initial value N(t0) using AII. Then, N(t) can be
obtained by using either (4.1) or (4.8), or jointly.
It has been shown that the rekeying messages must be delivered reliably and
in a timely manner in order to guarantee the quality of service [62]. Therefore,
it is possible that rekeying messages are treated differently from the regular data
in terms of error control, or even transmitted in a reliable multicast channel sep-
arated from the channel used for transmitting multicast content. This provides
an opportunity for outsiders to separate the rekeying messages and the multicast
content. Thus, the outsiders may also launch attack AII directly by monitoring
the transmission of the rekeying messages.
It should be noted that the performance of the attack AI and AII degrades
when many users join/leave simultaneously. It will be shown in Section 4.3 that
the rekeying message size still reveals a significant amount of information on GDI
even when multiple users are removed from or added to the key tree together.
4.2.3 Vulnerability of popular centralized key management
schemes
The attack methods described in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 can be tailored to many
other key management schemes. When the inside attacker can separate the rekey-
ing messages for user join and those for user departure, they launch AI type attacks.
When the amount of rekeying messages is largely depends on the group size, attack-
ers can launch AII type attacks, although the estimator may be slightly different
from (4.8). In this section, we review several key management schemes and discuss
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their vulnerability to AI and AII type attacks.
Since protecting GDI is not part of the design goal in traditional key manage-
ment schemes, it is not surprising that some schemes reveal GDI in a very direct
way. For example, in the approach proposed in [22], a security lock is implemented
based on the Chinese remainder theorem and the length of the lock is proportional
to the number of users. Thus, N(t) is obtained by measure the length of the lock,
which is the simplest AII type attack.
Tree-based key management schemes have been known for their efficiency in
terms of the usage of communication, computation and storage resources. Many
tree-based schemes, such as [4,17–19], are similar to that described in Section . In
these cases, both AI and AII type attacks can be applied. In [16, 20, 21], another
class of tree-based schemes were presented to further reduce the communication
overhead by introducing the dependency among keys, such as using one-way func-
tion trees. In these schemes, only AII type attacks are suitable.
Besides the tree-based scheme described in Section , VersaKey framework [18]
also includes a centralized flat scheme. When a user joins or leaves the group,
the rekeying message size equals to the length of the binary representation of the
user ID, which can be independent of N(t). Thus, this key management scheme
is resistant to both AI and AII type attacks. This scheme, however, is vulnerable
to collusion attacks. That is, the KDC cannot update keys without leaking new
key information to the leaving user, who has a collusion partner in the group.
Although the GDI is protected, this scheme cannot protect the multicast content
well when collusion attacks are likely.
In Iolus [23], a large group is decomposed into a number of subgroups, and
the trusted local security agents perform admission control and key updating for
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the subgroups. This architecture reduces the number of users affected by key
updating due to membership changes. Since the key updating is localized within
each subgroup, the attacker can only obtain the dynamic membership information
of the subgroup that he belongs to.
The idea of clustering was introduced in [24] to achieve the efficiency by lo-
calizing the key updating. The group members are organized into a hierarchical
clustering structure. The cluster leaders are selected from group members and
perform partial key management. Since the cluster leaders establish keys for the
cluster members through pair-wise key exchange [24], the cluster members cannot
obtain GDI of their clusters. However, the cluster leaders naturally obtain the
dynamic membership information of their cluster and all clusters below by partici-
pating key management. In [24], the cluster size is chosen from 3 to 15. Therefore,
this key management scheme can be applied only when a large potion of group
members are trusted to perform key management and obtain GDI.
In Chapter 2, we have presented a topology-matching key management (TMKM)
scheme that reduced the communication overhead associated with key updating by
matching the key tree with the network topology and localizing the transmission
of the rekeying messages. In this scheme, group members receive only the rekey-
ing messages that are useful for themselves and their neighbors. Thus, they only
obtains the local GDI by using AI or AII type attacks.
As a summary, Table 4.1 lists various key management schemes and their vul-
nerability to AI and AII type attacks. We can see that the AII type attacks are
effective for stealing GDI or local GDI from many key management schemes. Two
schemes, flat VersaKey [18] and the clustering [24], are resistant to these attacks.
Their usage, however, are limited by the fact that they are either not resistant to
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Is attack AII Is Attack AI
Centralized Key Management Schemes Effective? Effective?
Tree Based




One-way function tree [20] Yes No
Improve Key Revocation [16]
ELK [21]
Flat
Security lock [22] Yes –
Flat centralized scheme No No
in VersaKey framework [18]∗
Local security
agents
Iolus [23] Local Local
Clustering [24]∗ No No
Others TMKM [63] Local Local
Table 4.1: Vulnerability of popular centralized key management schemes
collusion attacks or must put trust in a large number of cluster leaders. Therefore,
it is very important to investigate the anti-attack techniques to protect group dy-
namic information that are compatible with a variety of key management schemes.
4.3 Anti-attack Techniques
We have discussed two types of attacks that can steal GDI from centralized key
management schemes. This discussion, however, does not cover all aspects of the
97
key management schemes that can reveal group dynamic information. For example,
the number of KEKs possessed by the inside attacker equals to the depth of the
key tree and reveals at least the order of the group size. We can also show that
the IDs of the keys reveal the structure of the key tree. Thus, new attack methods
may emerge in the future. Therefore, we propose an anti-attack framework that
is robust to various types of attacks and compatible with most centralized key
management schemes.
We first introduce the concept of Batch Rekeying that plays an important role
in our anti-attack technique. As proposed in [39], batch rekeying is to postpone
the update of keys such that several users can be added to or removed from the
key tree altogether. Compared with updating keys immediately after each user
join or departure, batch rekeying reduces the communication overhead at the ex-
pense of allowing the joining/leaving user to access a small amount of information
before/after his join/departure.
In this work, batch rekeying is implemented as periodic updating of keys and
the time between key updates are fixed and denoted by Bt. Particularly, the users
who join or leave the group in the time interval [(k − 1)Bt, kBt], are added to
or removed from the key tree together at time kBt. Then, the notations of GDI
functions are simplified as: J(k) = J((k − 1)Bt, kBt), L(k) = L((k − 1)Bt, kBt),
and N(k) = N(kBt).
Since the AI type attacks are effective only when users are added to or removed
from the key tree individually, utilizing batch rekeying can fight against the AI type
attacks. However, batch rekeying alone is not enough to fight against the AII type
attacks. Figure 4.2 shows some simulation results for the batch rekeying when Bt is
set to be 5 minutes. Simulation setup is similar to that in Section 4.2.2. The solid
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for the real GDI
for the artificial GDI
Figure 4.2: The anti-attack scheme using phantom users and batch rekeying
line in Figure 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 4.2(c), 4.2(d) represent the N(k), J(k), L(k) and
the rekeying message size, respectively. One can see that the rekeying message
size is closely related to L(k) and reflects the trend of N(k). A large amount of
information about N(k) and L(k) can be obtained by the attackers from examining
the rekeying message size.
Besides using batch rekeying, we propose to insert phantom users into the
system. These phantom users, as well as their join and departure behavior, are
created by the KDC in such a way that the combined effects of the phantom users
and the real users lead to a new rekeying process, called observed rekeying process,
which is observed by the attackers. An important goal is for the system to produce
an observed rekeying process that reveals the least amount of information about
the GDI.
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Let Na(k) denote the total number of the real and phantom users, and Ja(k)
and La(k) denote the total number of the real and phantom users who join/leave
the service respectively. Na(t), Ja(k), and La(k) are referred to as the artificial
GDI. From the key management points of view, the phantom users are treated
the same as the real users. They occupy leaf nodes on the key tree, and they are
associated with a set of KEKs that are updated when they virtually join or leave
the group. Thus, the observed rekeying process only depends on the artificial GDI.
We first consider choosing the artificial GDI as a set of constant functions, that
is,
Ja(k) = L0, La(k) = L0, Na(k) = N0. (4.9)
By doing so, the observed rekeying process does not leak the information about the
changing trend of the real GDI. However, the perfect flat artificial GDI functions
in (4.9) may not be achievable. Since the real GDI functions are random processes,
it is possible that the predetermined L0 and N0 are not large enough such that the
artificial GDI cannot be maintained as straight lines. For example, when N(k) >
N0, Na(k) cannot be the predetermined value N0 because the number of phantom
users must be non-negative. In fact, the artificial GDI functions must satisfies four
requirements: (r1) Na(k) ≥ N(k), (r2) La(k) ≥ L(k), (r3) Ja(k) ≥ J(k), and (r4)
Na(k) = Na(k − 1) + Ja(k) − La(k). In this work, we choose the artificial GDI
functions as:
Na(k) = max{N(k), N0} (4.10)
Ja(k) = max{J(k), L(k), L0} (4.11)
La(k) = Na(k − 1)−Na(k) + Ja(k) (4.12)
When N(k) ≤ N0, L(k) ≤ L0, and J(k) ≤ L0, equation (4.10)-(4.12) are equivalent
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to (4.9). The artificial GDI functions in (4.10)-(4.12) obviously satisfy requirement
(r1) (r3) and (r4). Next, we prove that the requirement (r2) is also satisfied.
• When N(k) > N0, it follows that
La(k) = Na(k − 1)−Na(k) + Ja(k) ≥ L(k) = N(k − 1)−N(k) + J(k),
using the fact that Na(k− 1) ≥ N(k− 1), Na(k) = N(k), and Ja(k) ≥ J(k).
• When N(k) ≤ N0, one can see that
La(k) ≥ Ja(k) ≥ L(k),
using the fact that Na(k − 1) ≥ N0 and Ja(k) ≥ L(k).
It shall be noted that there are many other ways to choose the artificial GDI
functions. The proposed anti-attack scheme supports any artificial GDI functions
that satisfy the requirement (r1)-(r4).
Given the artificial GDI functions, the KDC creates phantom users and per-
forms key management as follows.
(1) Determine N0 and L0 based on the system requirements and the users’ sta-
tistical behavior. The criteria for selecting N0 and L0 will be presented in
Section 4.4.
(2) Before the service starts, create N0 phantom users and establish a key tree
to accommodate them. Set index k = 1.
(3) While the service is not terminated, execute the following:
– Record user join and departure requests in the time period ((k − 1)Bt,
kBt], and obtain J(k) and L(k). During this time, the current session
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key is sent to the joining users such that they can start receiving the
multicast content without delay.
– At time kBt, the KDC creates Ja(k)− J(k) phantom users joining the
service, and then selects La(k) − L(k) phantom users in the current
system and makes them leave. Following the key updating procedure
presented in any existing key management schemes, the KDC updates
corresponding keys for real and phantom users’ join and departure. The
number of total real and phantom users are maintained to be Na(k).
– Set k = k + 1.
Figure 4.2(a), 4.2(b), and 4.2(c) illustrate the real GDI (N(k), L(k), J(k)) and
the artificial GDI (Na(k), La(k), Ja(k)) for a simulated multicast service. The
simulation results of communication overhead, i.e. the rekeying message size, is
shown in Figure 4.2(d), where the solid line represents the case without phantom
users and the dash line represents case when the proposed anti-attack method
is applied. We can see that the observed process reveals very limited information
about the real GDI. Not surprisingly, the communication overhead increases, which
is a disadvantage of utilizing phantom users.
Utilizing phantom users and batch rekeying is not the only solution to the
problem of GDI leakage. There are other techniques that can protect GDI from one
or several attacks. For example, embedding rekeying messages into the multicast
content [19] can prevent outside attackers to launch the AII type attacks. Using
the same rekeying procedure for user join and departure is also a good way to
prevent the AI type attacks. In addition, the KDC can generate faked rekeying
messages to prevent the AII type attacks, which is different from the proposed
anti-attack scheme where the key tree reserves slots for the phantom users and all
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rekeying messages have meanings.
Compared with other techniques, using phantom users and batch rekeying has
two major advantages. First, the proposed anti-attack scheme resists to a variety
of attacks. Since the real GDI are concealed before the rekeying messages are
generated, the attackers only see the artificial GDI from the observed rekeying
process unless they break the encryption or compromise the KDC. Second, the
proposed scheme does not rely on specific rekeying algorithms and is compatible
with existing key management schemes.
4.4 Performance Measure and Optimization
In this section, we define two performance criteria and evaluate the performance of
the proposed anti-attack technique. The criteria are (a) the amount of information
leaked to the attackers measured by mutual information, and (b) the communica-
tion overhead introduced by the phantom users. We study the tradeoff between
these two metrics and provide a framework of choosing proper amount of phantom
users, described by the parameter L0 and N0 in (4.10)-(4.12).
4.4.1 The leakage of GDI
We use mutual information to measure the leakage of the GDI, which is indepen-
dent of the attack strategies adopted by the attackers and represents the maximum
amount of information that the attackers can possibly obtain. Let T be the total
number of key updating, that is, the service duration is TBt. Then, the real GDI
is described by a set of random variables as
R = {N(1), · · · , N(T ), J(1), · · · , J(T ), L(1), · · · , L(T )}, (4.13)
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and the artificial GDI is
A = {Na(1), · · · , Na(T ), Ja(1), · · · , Ja(T ), La(1), · · · , La(T )}. (4.14)
The mutual information, I(R; A), describes the reduction in the uncertainty of the
real GDI (R) due to the knowledge of the artificial GDI (A) [54]. Therefore, the
leakage of the GDI can be measured by
I(R; A) = H(A)−H(A|R), (4.15)
where H(.) and H(.|.) denote the entropy and conditional entropy, respectively.
Equation (4.10) - (4.12) indicate that the artificial GDI is a set of deterministic
functions of the real GDI. Thus, the conditional entropy in (4.15) equals to zero,
i.e. H(A|R) = 0. Since La(k) is directly computed from Ja(k), Na(k) and Na(k−1)
in (4.12), the terms La(1), La(2), · · · , La(T ) can be removed from the expression of
the entropy of A, i.e. H(A) = H(Na(1), · · · , Na(T ), Ja(1), · · · , Ja(T )). Then, the
upper bound of I(R; A) is calculated as:







The equality is achieved when {Na(k), Ja(k), k = 1, · · · , T} are mutually indepen-
dent. It is noted that the GDI at time kBt and the GDI at time (k + 1)Bt can be
approximately independent when Bt is large and the group is high dynamic. In
these cases, (4.16) provides a tight upper bound of I(R; A).
We introduce pNk(n) and pNak(n) to denote the pmf of N(k) and Na(k), re-






x=0 pNk(x), n = N0




H(Na(k)) = −(1− εkN) log(1− εkN)−
∞∑
n=N0+1
pNk(n) log pNk(n), (4.17)
where εkN = 1−
∑N0
x=0 pNk(x). Similarly, let pJk(x), pJak(j), and pLk(y) denote the










(1− εkJ)(1− εkL), j = L0
pJk(j)
∑j−1
y=0 pLk(y) + pLk(j)
∑j−1
x=0 pJk(x) + pJk(j)pLk(j), j > L0
0, o.w.
(4.19)
where εkJ = 1 −
∑L0
x=0 pJk(x) and ε
k
L = 1 −
∑L0
y=0 pLk(y). Given the pmf of the
real GDI functions, the upper bound of I(R; A) is calculated from (4.16)-(4.19).
Since the observed rekeying process is determined by the artificial GDI, the mutual
information between the observed process and the real GDI is bounded by I(R; A)
due to the data processing theory [54]. Therefore, I(R; A) is the upper bound of
the amount of information that can be possibly obtained by the attackers.
From (4.10)-(4.12), one can see that the artificial GDI reveals the real GDI
when N(k) > N0, L(k) > L0, or J(k) > L0. We define overflow probability as
the probability that the artificial GDI cannot be straight lines, i.e. 1 −mink(1 −
εkN)(1 − εkL)(1 − εkJ). Besides the mutual information, overflow probability can be
a more visualized complementary measure for the leakage of the GDI. When the
overflow probability is zero, the calculation in (4.16)-(4.18) leads to the result that
I(R; A) = 0, which indicates the prefect protection of the real GDI.
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4.4.2 Communication overhead
Communication overhead, measured by the rekeying message size, is one of the
major performance criteria of key management schemes [3] [4]. We introduce
the notation M(L,N, d) as the expected value of the rekeying message size when
removing L users from the key tree that contains total N users and has degree d.
We assume that the leaving users are uniformly distributed on a full loaded and
balanced key tree. Then, there are dl KEKs at the lth level of the key tree for
l = 1, · · · , D− 2 and D = dlogd Ne, and the number of the KEKs at the (D− 1)th
level is s1 = dN−dD−1d−1 e.
Let αl be the number of KEKs need to be updated at level l when L user leaves
the service. Then, M(L,N, d) is expressed as:










We introduce the notation B(b, i, a), which is equivalent to the expected number
of non-empty boxes when putting i items in b boxes with repetition where each
box can have at most a items. The detailed calculation of B(b, i, a) is provided in
the Appendix. We can show that
E[αl] = d ·B(dl, L, N
dl
), 0 ≤ l ≤ D − 2, (4.21)












B(s1, L̃, d) (4.22)
Using the fact that d i
a
e ≤ B(b, i, a) ≤ min(b, i) (see Appendix), we can derive the
upper bound of the M(L,N, d) as:
M(L,N, d) ≤ dL logd(N). (4.23)
This upper bound indicates that the communication overhead increases linearly
with the number of departure users and with the logarithm of the group size.
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Let Cr and Ca be the average communication overhead for rekey process based
on real GDI and the artificial GDI, respectively. Then, the extra communication
overhead introduced by the proposed anti-attack technique is:








M(L(k), N(k), d). (4.24)
When the overflow probability is small, (4.24) can be approximated by:




M(L(k), N(k), d). (4.25)
4.4.3 System optimization
From the system design points of view, parameter L0 and N0 should be chosen such
that the leakage of the GDI is minimized while the extra communication overhead
do not exceed certain requirements. When the overflow probability is small, the










M(L0, N0, d) ≤ β, (4.27)
where β is the maximum allowed communication overhead per key updating. We
can show that H(Na(k)) in (4.18) is monotonous non-increasing with N0; H(Ja(k))
in (4.17) is monotonous non-increasing with L0; and the communication overhead
M(L0, N0, d) in (4.20) is non-decreasing with L0 and N0. Therefore, the optimiza-





















 Group Dynamic Information of the CBC Newsworld On−Line Test on 10/29/1996
















Figure 4.3: The GDI of a long audio session in MBone
where M−1(β)|L0,d is the largest value of N0 that satieties (4.27) with given L0 and
d. Fortunately, the number of departure users between two key updates is usually
not a large number in practice. Thus, the searching space for parameter L0 is not
large and this optimization problem can be solved by full search.
4.5 Simulations of the anti-attack scheme
Mlisten1, a tool developed at Georgia Institute of Technology, can collect the
join/leave time for the multicast group members in MBone [50] sessions. Using
this tool, the characteristics of the membership dynamics of MBone multicast
sessions has been studied in [50] [51].












































Figure 4.4: Upper bound of the GDI leakages
Particularly, we selected one audio session that started on Oct. 29th and lasted
for about 5 days and 20 hours. Figure 4.3 shows the N(k), L(k) and J(k) of this
session, where the Bt is chosen to be 15 minutes.
It is suggested that the users statistical behavior, such as inter-arrival and
membership durations, can be modelled by exponential distribution in a short
period of time [50]. In the simulation, the entire service time is divided into non-
overlapped sections, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. The length of these sessions is set
to be 4 hours. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that N(k), L(k) and J(k) are
stationary and ergodic Poisson processes in each session. Then, we can calculate
the GDI leakage using (4.16)-(4.19).
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 demonstrate the upper bound of mutual information


























































Figure 4.5: Communication overhead M(L0, N0, d)
and N0, respectively. We can see that communication overhead is a non-decreasing
function with L0 and N0, while the GDI leakage is a non-increasing function with
L0 and N0. This verifies the argument in Section 4.4.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the solution of the optimization problem. Figure 4.6(a)
shows the maximum value of N0 that satisfies the communication overhead con-
straint in (4.27) with fixed L0, i.e. N0 = max{N : M(L0, N, d) ≤ β}, where β is
chosen to be 50 in this example. As discussed in Section 4.4, the optimal values





k H(Ja(k)), is evaluated only at (L0, N0 = max{N :
M(L0, N, d) ≤ β}), which is shown in Figure 4.6(b). The optimal values of L0 and
N0 are also marked.
Figure 4.7 shows the tradeoff between the communication overhead and the GDI
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of selecting optimal parameters L0 and N0.
leakage. This figure demonstrates the upper bound of the mutual information as a
function of the communication overhead constraint, where the parameters L0 and
N0 have been optimized. This can help the system designer in determining the
proper β for the communication constraint in (4.27). When not using phantom
users, the artificial process is identical to the real process and we have I(R; A) =
I(R; R) = H(R). In this case, this particular multicast session require average 3.6
rekeying messages to be sent in every 15 minutes (Bt = 15) and has I(R; A) ≈ 137.
Figure 4.7 shows that the proposed anti-attack scheme can reduces I(R; A) to 5.5
by increasing the communication overhead to 23.2 messages every 15 minutes. The
communication overhead Ca is significantly larger than Cr because a large amount
of activities of the phantom users must be created. However, the absolute value of
the Cr is still small compared with the multicast data throughput. On the other
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 GDI leakage vs Communication Overhead for a non−active session
When not using phantom users
      communication overhead :  3.6
      leakage of GDI : 137 
Figure 4.7: The GDI leakage versus communication overhead for a real MBone
audio session
hand, the leakage of the group dynamic information is greatly reduced.
It is important to note that this MBone audio session contains only up to 60
users and represents the scenario where the group size is small and group members
are not very active. Due to the lack of the experimental data for large multicast
groups, we investigated a simulated multicast session with larger group size and
more active group members. The simulation setup is the same as that is used
for Figure 4.1(c) in Section 4.2, where the group size is about 500. When not
using phantom users, the KDC sends average 28.16 rekeying messages in every
5 minutes (Bt = 5), while the amount of information leaked to the attackers,
H(R), is 249.2. The performance of the proposed anti-attack methods is shown in
Figure 4.8. We can see that the GDI leakage can be reduced to 5 at the expense of
increasing the communication overhead to 93 messages per 5 minutes. The relative
communication increase is smaller than that for the less active sessions.
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 GDI leakage vs Communication Overhead for an active session
When not using phantom users:
      communication overhead :  28.16
      leakage of GDI: 249.2
Figure 4.8: The GDI leakage versus communication overhead for a simulated mul-
ticast session
4.6 Contributory Key Management Schemes
As we have discussed in the previous sections, group keys are generated and dis-
tributed by the key distribution center when centralized key management schemes
are employed. In many scenarios, however, it is not preferred to rely on a central-
ized server that arbitrates the establishment of the group key. This might occur
in applications where group members do not explicitly trust a single entity, or
there are no servers or group members who have sufficient resources to maintain,
generate and distribute keying information. Thus, the distributed solution of the
key management problem has seen considerable attention [18,25–33].
The contributory key management schemes do not rely on centralized servers.
Instead, every group member makes independent contribution and participates the
process of group key establishment. The members’ personal keys are not disclosed
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to any other entities [28]. An important class of contributory key management
schemes, such as [25–33], are inspired by the Diffie-Hellman (DH) two-party key
exchange protocol [35], and are usually refereed to as the Diffie-Hellman-like pro-
tocols. Compared with the centralized schemes, the contributory schemes have the
advantage of not putting full trust on a single entity and therefore do not suffer
the problem of single-point-failure. However, their distributed nature makes the
task of protecting the GDI very difficult. In this section, we investigate the ways
that the group members acquire GDI from the Diffie-Hellman-like key management
schemes and provide a brief discussion on preventing the leakage of GDI.
4.6.1 Fully and partially contributory key management schemes
We discuss two slightly different flavors of contributory key agreement scheme:
fully contributory and partially contributory.
In the fully contributory schemes, all key agreement operations are contributed
to every group member [29]. Since there is no dedicated group manager, every
participant may perform admission control and other administrative functions [29].
Thus, group members are naturally aware of the information about the group
membership. In addition, group members are usually arranged in a logical ring [25],
a logical chain [28–30], or a logical tree [31–33]. These logical ring/chain/tree
structures describe the key establishment procedure, and must be maintained and
updated by every member independently in the fully contributory environment [31].
This, again, requires members to have knowledge of the initial group membership as
well as the membership changes. Therefore, the fully contributory schemes, whose
implementation relies on the members’ knowledge on dynamic group membership,
are not suitable for the multicast applications with confidential GDI.
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In the partially contributory schemes, one group member takes on a special
role and performs some operations in a centralized manner [28] [29]. This special
member is usually referred to as the group controller. The role of the group con-
troller can be assigned to a fixed member or be handed over to other members
when membership changes [29]. The group controller is different from the KDC in
the centralized schemes because it does not hold the private keys of other members
or generate the complete group key for other members. Instead, it may perform
admission control and coordinate the process of the key formation. The original
purpose of introducing group controller is to achieve efficient key updating in the
case of user joining and departure [28]. In the context of protecting GDI, the
partially contributory schemes make it possible to confine dynamic membership
information to the group controllers while preventing other group members from
accessing GDI. Although only a handful of contributory schemes [28–32] suggest
using group controller, most of the schemes [25–27, 33] can work in the partially
contributory manner. For contributory key management schemes, the fundamen-
tal rule for protecting GDI is that a group controller that is trusted to handle GDI
shall perform admission control, maintain the logical key ring/chain/tree structure
and coordinate the process of the key formation.
4.6.2 Vulnerability of popular contributory key manage-
ment schemes
Utilizing group controller is not a complete solution to the GDI protection problem.
Next, we examine the Diffie-Hellman-like key management schemes and demon-
strate various other opportunities for the insiders to acquire group dynamic infor-
mation.
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The scheme presented in [25] is the earliest attempted to extend two-party
Diffie-Hellman protocol to group scenario. This scheme, sometimes referred to as
ING [30], arranges members in a logical ring and is executed in (n − 1) round,
where n is the group size. Therefore, every member obtains the group size by
simply counting the number of rounds that he performed.
Similarly, the schemes presented in [26] and [27], referred to as the STR and BD
respectively, also reveal the group size. Here, each member receives the broadcast
messages from all other members, and therefore must know the existence of other
group members.
In [31] [32] [33], logical tree structures are introduced to manage the formation
of the group keys. In these schemes, each member performs L rounds and holds L
subgroup keys, where L is the depth of the key tree. Since L is proportional to the
logarithm of the group size, group members know at least the order of the group
size.
Another important set of contributory key management schemes are GDH.1,
GDH.2 and GDH.3 [28]. These schemes arrange group members in a logical chain
and accumulate the keying material by traversing group members one by one. In
GDH.1/2, the kth member receive k or k + 1 messages from the (k− 1)th member.
Thus, the amount of the messages reveals information about the group size. The
users who are closer to the end of the chain have more accurate information about
the group size. GDH.3 is executed in four stages [28]. In the second and the fourth
stage, the last user on the key chain broadcast n messages to the rest of the group,
and n is the group size. In all three schemes, the group size information is revealed
by the size of keying messages.
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4.6.3 Prevention of GDI leakage
As discussed in Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.2, the contributory key management schemes
are more vulnerable to GDI attacks than the centralized schemes. Besides ex-
amining rekeying message size as in the centralized schemes, the attackers can
also steal GDI through performing admission control, maintaining the logical key
ring/chain/tree structure, and counting the number of rounds in the contributory
key management schemes.
In general, we suggest using centralized key management schemes for the ap-
plications with confidential GDI. However, there are scenarios that centralized
schemes cannot be employed, such as when no trusted centralized entities exist.
In these cases, we suggest using GDH.3, which has the strongest centrality flavor
amongst contributory schemes. As discussed in Section 4.6.2, GDH.3 reveals group
size through the broadcast message size. Thus, the following modifications must
be made.
• Selecting the group member at the end of the logical chain as the group
controller, who performs admission control and coordinates the key formation
such that a regular member only communications with his two neighbors on
the key chain and the group controller in the key establishment process.
• Replacing the broadcasting in the second and fourth stage [28] by multiple
unicasting, which unfortunately increases the communication overhead.
The modified GDH.3 prevents regular group members from obtaining the informa-
tion on the group size, at the expenses of non-scalable communication overhead.
In addition, anti-traffic-analysis techniques, such as in [64] [65], shall be used to
prevent the GDI attacks from outsiders, which will not be discussed in this work.
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In this chapter, we raised the issues of the disclosure of dynamic group mem-
bership information through key management. We demonstrated that such a new
security threat impacts various group communication applications. We developed
attack strategies that could steal the GDI from key management. To protect GDI,
an anti-attack framework was investigated, that involves utilizing batch rekeying,




Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation presented the design of network-specific and application specific
group key management schemes and investigated the problem of protecting dy-
namic group membership information in secure group communications.
In particular, we presented a method for designing the multicast key manage-
ment tree in the mobile wireless environment. By matching the key management
tree to the cellular network topology and localizing the delivery of rekeying mes-
sages, a significant reduction in the communication burden associated with rekey-
ing was observed compared to trees that are independent of the topology. We
designed a topology-matching key management tree that consists of user-subtrees,
BS-subtrees and SH-subtrees. It was shown that the problem of optimizing the
communication cost for the TMKM tree is separable and can be solved by opti-
mizing each of those subtrees separately. The ALX tree structure, which easily
adapts to changes in the number of users, was introduced to build user-subtrees
and BS-subtrees. The performance of the ALX tree is very close to the performance
lower bound for any fixed degree tree. The GSHD algorithm, which considers the
network heterogeneity where the SHs administer areas with varying network con-
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ditions, was introduced to build the SH subtree. The performance of the GSHD
algorithm is very close to the optimal and has better performance than treating
SHs equally. Additionally, we addressed the consequences that user mobility has
upon the TMKM tree, and presented an efficient handoff scheme to reduce the
communication burden associated with rekeying. A popular user joining/leaving
procedure was used to study the performance of the TMKM and TIKM trees.
Both simulations and analysis were provided. For systems consisting of only one
SH, simulations performed for different user-join rates and mobile user speeds
show that the cost of the TMKM tree is approximately 33-45% of the cost of the
TIKM tree, which indicates a reduction of 55-67% in the total communication cost.
For systems consisting of multiple SHs, simulations were performed for different
amounts of participating SHs, and indicated that the TMKM tree can reduce the
communication burden by as much as 80%. In addition, both analysis and simula-
tions indicate that the communication cost of the TMKM tree scales better than
that of topology-independent trees as the number of participating SHs increases.
While traditional group key management only provides the same access priv-
ilege to all group members, this dissertation presented a multi-group key man-
agement scheme that achieves hierarchical group access control in secure group
communications. Hierarchical access control problem prevails in multimedia group
applications, where multiple data streams are distributed to group members with
various access privileges. We designed an integrated key graph, as well as the
rekey algorithms, which allow users subscribing/dropping the group communi-
cations and changing access levels while maintaining the forward and backward
security. Compared with using the existing tree-based key management schemes
that are designed for a single multicast session, the proposed scheme can greatly
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reduce the overhead associated with key management. In the multi-layer services
containing 4 layers, we observed more than 50% reduction in the usage of storage,
computation, and communication resources in the centralized environments, and
the number of rounds to establish and update keys in the contributory environ-
ments. More importantly, the proposed scheme scales better than the existing
tree-based schemes, when the group applications contains more data streams and
require the mechanism to manage more levels of access control.
Besides scalability issues, a more fundamental concern of group key manage-
ment is security. This dissertation raised the issues of the disclosure of dynamic
group membership information through key management in secure multicast com-
munications. Such a security concern has not been addressed in traditional key
management schemes. We demonstrated that the attackers can successfully obtain
good estimates of the GDI from a large number of centralized and contributory key
management schemes, and investigated the techniques of improving or modifying
the existing key management schemes such that the GDI as well as the multicast
content is protected. For the centralized key management schemes, we developed
two effective attack strategies, which exploit the format and the size of the rekey-
ing messages. To protect the GDI, we proposed the anti-attack technique utilizing
batch rekeying and phantom users. This anti-attack technique reduces the leakage
of the GDI and is fully compatible with the existing centralized key management
schemes. We investigated the tradeoff between the communication overhead and
the leakage of the GDI, and provided a framework for selecting the proper amount
of phantom users. The proposed anti-attack technique was tested on real MBone
user log data and simulated multicast sessions. We also demonstrated the vulner-
ability of the contributory key management schemes, where group members can
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acquire the group size from performing admission control, maintaining logical key
ring/chain/tree structure, counting the number of rounds and measuring the num-
ber of the key exchange messages. In the contributory environment, the solution of
protecting GDI involves utilizing the group controller and modifying the existing
GDH.3 key establishment protocol.
Based on the research results presented in this dissertation, there are several
research directions that can be further investigated:
Fault-tolerant contributory key agreement
Besides the technologies that have been presented in this dissertation, we plan
to incorporate the fault-tolerate features in the future design, especially for con-
tributory key management. The existing contributory key management schemes
assume that users honestly perform the key agreement protocol. As a result, they
perform poorly or not at all in the presence of malicious group members who ma-
nipulate the keying messages and aim to cause the key agreement process to fails.
To demonstrate this fact, we examine one of the most popular schemes for dis-
tributed key agreement, namely GDH.2. This scheme organizes the users in a
chain. Each user performs computation and passes some intermediate values to
the next user. This stage of the scheme is referred to as upflow and continues until
the computation and passing on of intermediate results has reached the last user
at the end of the chain. Then, the direction of information flow is reversed and the
scheme enters its downflow stage. The users once again perform computation on
intermediate values and pass them on. During both upflow and downflow stages,
malicious users have the opportunity to selectively sabotage the intermediate re-
sults calculated by the users that are ordered before them in the chain. At the end
of the key agreement protocol, all users individually calculate the group key. The
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users, whom have been targeted by the malicious users, will have a different key
from the rest of the group. In this case, no common group secret is established
for securing group communication and the group key agreement protocol fails. For
GDH.2, we can show that a malicious user can sabotage and remain undetected
even after the key generation protocol is run many times with different orderings
of the users. The failure of key agreement not only prevents secure group commu-
nication, but also causes extra use of computational and communication resources
that are precious for wireless scenarios. All communication and computation spent
on the key agreement is in vein since it is not possible to recover or reuse any part
of previous group secret.
We believe that one of the largest problems with GDH.2 and any scheme that
operates in a similar manner is the lack of verifying intermediate steps. In order to
detect malicious users and recover from possible errors, our preliminary investiga-
tion suggests that distributed tree-based key agreement schemes, have the potential
of detecting malicious users and allow for efficient recovery from key establishment
failure. In tree-based key agreement schemes, the keys are generated recursively,
allowing us to integrate detection and error recovery in the key generation process.
We propose to design a protocol that detects malicious behavior/error by selec-
tively validating the intermediate results and achieves fast recovery by reusing
validated intermediate keys. The idea is to solve the dispute locally before it
affects the entire group. We will investigate the tradeoff between the probabil-
ity of successful establishing the group key and the increased communication and
computation cost due to the checking mechanism.
Topology-aware hierarchical access control with GDI protection
In this dissertation, we have addressed the topology-aware key management,
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hierarchical access control and GDI protection separately. In the future, we plan
to develop a suite of key management design techniques that incorporate all above
advanced technologies. For example, topology-match key management has positive
influence on protecting GDI because the users may only obtain their local GDI
in TMKM scheme. In addition, the hierarchical key management design may
also consider topology issues, when the access requirement is correlated with the
physical locations of users.
More topics in wireless network security
Wireless communication has dramatically changed the way people work and
interact. Unfortunately, the wireless era continues to be plagued by insufficient
security. Key management solves the group access control problem, but it is not
the complete solution of wireless network security problem. In wireless networks,
the security weakness exists in every layer. In the future, we will investigate secure
routing in ad hoc networks and securing resource allocation against greedy users.
Secure routing protocols are the foundation of the dependability in ad hoc
networks. Various attacks, such as black/gray hole, rushing attack, blackmail,
wormhole, prevent good routes being discovered and cause denial-of-service. We
would like to develop a set of mechanisms to secure against routing disruptions.
For each node, the first mechanism is to launch a route traffic observer to moni-
tor the behavior of each valid route in its route cache, and to collect the packet
forwarding statistics submitted by the hops on the routes. Since malicious nodes
may submit false report, for each node, the next mechanism is to keep a cheating
record database for the other nodes. If a node is detected as dishonest, future route
discovery should prevent this node from being on the route. The third mechanism
is to use friendship (trust relationship) to speed up the malicious node detection.
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The fourth mechanism is to explore route diversity by discovering multiple routes
to the destination, which can increase the chance to defeat the malicious nodes
aiming to prevent good routes from being discovered. Instead of waiting for all the
routes in its route cache becoming invalid, an adaptive route rediscovery mecha-
nism is applied by each node to determine when a new route discovery should be
initiated. Based on the observed behavior and the history record of each node,
the design goal is to improve the network performance by limiting the damage of
malicious attacks and detecting malicious nodes.
The common philosophy of resource allocation is to improve overall network
performance or achieve fairness, by properly assigning network resources to users.
One example is the power control algorithm in 3G wireless networks, where the
base stations assign different transmission power to mobile users according to their
channel conditions. Many resource allocation algorithms require the measurement
or feedback of users’ status, such as their computation capability and channel
conditions. However, greedy or malicious users can make dishonest claims or ma-
nipulate the measurements, hoping that they can get more system resources or
cause denial-of-service to other honest users. To make things even worse, it can
be extremely difficult to detect these dishonest claims and manipulated measure-
ments. I believe that resource allocation algorithms should consider this security
threat in the early design stage. We propose to quantify this security concern
and introduce a security constraint for resource allocation. There will be a trade-
off between the optimality of the resource allocation and the robustness to false
measurement/claims. The ultimate goal is to understand the interplay between
security and quality of service.
As a summary, while attack and anti-attack as two major forces that drive
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Calculation of B(b, i, a)
We define n(b, i, a) to be the number of non-empty boxes when randomly placing
i identical items into b identical boxes with repetition, where each box can hold
at most a items. In this appendix, we calculate B(b, i, a) as the expected value of
n(b, i, a), i.e. B(b, i, a) = E[n(b, i, a)]. It is obvious that the value of n(b, i, a) is





and B1 = min(i, b).
We define an intermediate quantity w(y, i, a) as the number of ways of putting
i items into y boxes such that each box contains at least 1 and at most a items.
w(y, i, a) can be calculated recursively as:


















w(B0 + m, i, a), (A.2)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ B1 −B0. Then, the pmf of n(b, i, a) can be expressed as:













represents the total number of ways of putting i items into b boxes.
By substituting (A.2) into (A.3), we get:






















) Prob{n(b, i, a) = B0 + m}.


































Prob{n(b, i, a) = B0 + m}. (A.4)
By substituting (A.1) into (A.3), we have:










Based on (A.4) and (A.5), we can calculate Prob{n(b, i, a) = B0 + k} for k =
0, 1, · · · , B1−B0 recursively. Then, we can calculate B(b, i, a), i.e. E[n(b, i, a)], as:
B(b, i, a) =
B1−B0∑
k=0
(B0 + k) · Prob{n(b, i, a) = B0 + k}. (A.6)
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Appendix B
Calculation of pmf of
˜
I
Let tM denote the service duration, tn denote the new cell dwell time, and th denote
the previously handed-off cell dwell time [57]. We assume that tM follows exponen-
tial distribution. The distributions of tn and th are often presented together with
the mobility models. For the mobility model used in Section 2.7, the distribution
of tn and th can be found in [57].
Using these distributions, we calculate pn = Prob{tM < tn} and ph = Prob{tM <
th}. The number of cells that a user ever visited before departure, denoted by Ĩ,
has the pmf as Prob{Ĩ = 1} = pn, Prob{Ĩ = 2} = (1 − pn)ph, Prob{Ĩ = 3} =
(1− pn)(1− ph)ph, and Prob{Ĩ = i} = (1− pn)(1− ph)i−2ph.
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